


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CHURCH & STATE

POLITICAL ASPECTS
OF SIXTEENTH CENTURY
PURITANISM

BY

Andrew Forster *The Rev.*
A. SCOTT PEARSON
D.TH., D.LITT., F.R.HIST.S.



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To

The Right Reverend Norman Maclean, D.D.

MODERATOR OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OF THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND
1927-8

PREFACE

IN this book we have examined the ecclesiastico-political creed of the sixteenth century Puritans. We have sought to reveal the fact that their leader, Thomas Cartwright, was more politically minded than he himself realised. Indeed, we have psycho-analysed a Puritan and found a politician. We are sure, however, that the chief determinant in the life of the Christian reformer was his religious and not his political faith. At the same time we feel that the findings of this volume raise the important and fascinating question of the relation between religious and political motives. According to Aristotle, man is a political animal. He is also a religious animal. The exposition of this religio-political dualism (primarily religio-political and only secondarily ecclesiastico- and theologico-political) in human life is worthy of the deepest attention of Christian thinkers. Professor Laski in his *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* has referred to the subject as illustrated by Bismarck and De Maistre and, as we go to press, we notice that Dr Prynce Hopkins deals with certain aspects of it in his new book *Fathers or Sons? A Study in Social Psychology*. It is a subject of vital import to all students of Church and State.

Another theme suggested by this work should be of special interest to Scottish readers, namely, the influence of Cartwright on the Scottish Church and in particular on the Disruption controversy. The

repudiation of the two-kingdom theory by the civil authorities of the first half of the nineteenth century led, in Scotland, to the Disruption and, in England, to the Oxford movement. In Scotland the theory was widely held because it was part and parcel of a long and cherished tradition handed down from the Reformation and especially from the time of Andrew Melville. We believe that Melville and his successors who held firmly to the doctrine of coordinate jurisdiction received much of their inspiration from the English Puritan ecclesiastico-political creed. Melville himself propounded his two-kingdom principles *after* they had been enunciated and elaborated by Cartwright in the 'seventies of the sixteenth century and we know that he had intimate associations with the English Puritan movement and its chief exponents. We are therefore led to the presumption that Melville was influenced by the tenets of his English brethren. Further, the gradual recognition by the State in recent times of the Disruption principles, for instance, the non-intrusion of ministers and, later, the spiritual independence of the Church, suggests that the English Puritan's teaching has left its mark on the present ecclesiastical situation in Scotland, which, in virtue of Acts of Parliament passed in 1921 and 1925, in many respects represents the fulfilment of Cartwright's ideals. Can it be that under God this Puritan has played a leading but largely unacknowledged rôle in the shaping of Scottish ecclesiastical history throughout the past three centuries? To trace his influence from Melville onwards is a most interesting and important task.

How far the Oxford movement and the Roman Catholic advance in England are due to the stifling of Cartwright's voice in English history is also a question of great moment. Newman, of course, was not like Chalmers the ecclesiastico-political child of the Puritan. The fact that he looked to Aquinas for anti-Erastian inspiration suggests an interesting parallelism between the Roman Catholic and the Presbyterian two-kingdom theories.

We would point out that our references to Cartwright's first *Reply* are to the most accessible reprint in the Parker Society's edition of Whitgift's Works.

A. F. SCOTT PEARSON

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ABBREVIATIONS

- Bancroft, *Survey* = *A Survey of the Pretended Holy Discipline*.
R. Bancroft. 1593.
- B.U.K. = *The Booke of the Universale Kirk of Scotland*.
3 vols. 1839-45.
- Eccl. Disc.* = *Ecclesiasticae Disciplinae, et Anglicanae Ecclesiae ab illa aberrationis, plena e verbo Dei, & dilucida explicatio*. [W. Travers.] 1574.
- Full and Plaine* = *A Full and Plaine Declaration of Ecclesiasticall Discipline owt off the word off God and off the declininge off the Church of England from the same*. [W. Travers.] 1574.
- Gooch = *English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth Century*. G. P. Gooch. 2nd ed. 1927.
- Gregory = *Puritanism in the Old World and in the New*.
J. Gregory. 1895.
- Hearnshaw = *Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Renaissance and the Reformation*. Ed. F. J. C. Hearnshaw. 1925.
- Knox, *Works* = *The Works of John Knox*. Ed. D. Laing.
6 vols. 1895.
- Second Replie* = *The Second Replie of Thomas Cartwright: agaynst Maister Doctor Whitgiftes second answer, touching the Church Discipline*. 1575.
- S.P.T.C. = *Thomas Cartwright and Elizabethan Puritanism*. A. F. Scott Pearson. 1925.
- The Rest* = *The Rest of the second replie of Thomas Cartvurihgt agaynst Master Doctor Vuhitgifts second ansouer, touching the Church discipline*. 1577.
- W.W. = *The Works of John Whitgift*. Parker Soc.
3 vols. 1851-3.

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

IT has been affirmed on the one hand that the early Puritans had no political views and that they were completely absorbed by religious feeling,¹ and on the other hand that the strongest element in the Reformation was the political.² In order to throw light upon this diversity of opinion we propose to examine the Puritan movement in the age of Elizabeth from the political point of view, and to make a particular search in the life and work of the leading representative of the movement, Thomas Cartwright.

Before this enquiry could be adequately undertaken it was necessary to have Cartwright's career disentangled from traditional accretions and prejudices, and set forth by methods of modern historical research in the light of original documentary evidence. This end I have already sought to accomplish in my recently published volume entitled *Thomas Cartwright and Elizabethan Puritanism*, which claims to be a dispassionate piece of work undertaken from the point of view of fact. In the course of my research I became aware of the value of the materials amassed and the relationships established for the student of political history and science. Accordingly, I now make use of data procured by original research in the sixteenth

¹ Borgeaud, quoted by Gregory, 23.

² Hearnshaw, 28.

century field in order, if possible, to elucidate the political significance of a certain phase of Protestantism, a task that in view of the disparity of opinion of which we have spoken requires fulfilment.

It may be stated with emphasis at the outset that Cartwright did not regard himself as a student of political science or write as such. When he delivered an oration against absolute monarchy at Cambridge in 1564 it was as an academician taking part in a philosophy Act. His speech certainly shows that he was acquainted with the political thought of classical antiquity and that he possessed certain definite political convictions before he entered the lists as a Puritan. His views in favour of a limited monarchy he carried with him into Puritanism and we find them embodied in the Presbyterian polity which he advocated, but as a Puritan he does not set himself to promote a definite political creed. His writings, polemical and expository, are concerned with ecclesiastical and theological subjects. It is only incidentally that he reveals his political views. Indeed, as a Puritan divine, he disclaims any right to be a political student or a meddler in practical politics. While criticising Whitgift's condemnation of popular government, such as underlay the Presbyterian conception that the people's consent was necessary in the election of ministers, Cartwright says:

I dowbte not that wise men doo see your folie, which beinge so unskilfull of the government of the churche, the knowledge wherof you doo professe: will take upon yow as Phormio unto Haniball, to prescribe what forme of governe-mente must be used in the commenwealth. And *if it were*

not beside my profession, I coulde shewe that it agreeth moste bothe with the definition of a cytisen, which those gyve which handell this matter, and with the practise off the beste governed cities, that the cytisens should have this intereste off choise off their Maiors and Bailifes: confirmed by experience off daungerous seditions and seperations from the commen wealth, which have happened by abridginge the people off this and suche liberties. *But for so muche as yt belongethe not unto a divine to medle with those*, but to contente him selfe with what forme off governnemente soever (so it be lawfull) thowght good to those, to whom the orderinge of that doothe perteine: I leave to speake of that matter.¹

Luther was not a politician by choice but by force of circumstances. Calvin does not deal with the subject "Of Civil Government" till the last chapter of his *Institutes* and even then only after a half-apology, in which he affirms that the subject is related to Christian doctrine and speaks of the need of countering the prevalent extreme views regarding civil magistrates.² Cartwright is just as reluctant to give expression to political opinions, but as he protests that it is not a theologian's proper function to do so we are struck by the fact that he has definite political interests which cannot hide themselves. Indeed, the passage in which Cartwright declares that it is a

¹ *Second Replie*, 228. Italics are the present writer's.

² *Institutio*, lib. IV, c. xx, § 1. Etsi enim a spirituali fidei doctrina, quam tractandam suscepi, separata esse videtur hujus argumenti ratio, progressus tamen ostendet, merito a me conjungi, imo necessitate me impelli ut id faciam: praesertim quoniam ab una parte amentes et barbari homines ordinem hunc divinitus sancitum furiose evertere conantur, principum vero adulatores, eorum potentiam sine modo extollentes, Dei ipsius imperio opponere non dubitant. Utrique malo nisi obviam eatur, peribit fidei sinceritas.

minister's duty to be non-political is full of political suggestion. It shows that the Puritan recognised a line of demarcation between theology and politics, that he was acquainted with the writings of exponents of political thought, that he was specially interested in the government of city-states and had studied their history, that he was a believer in the rights of the people and knew the dangers involved in the reduction of their liberties, that he held that the ordering of civil government did not pertain to ecclesiastics and that the duty of the latter was to accept the established form of government "so it be lawfull". The qualifying clause in itself has great political significance. It constitutes the sting in the tail of the passage, for it involves such questions as: By what law is the civil government to be judged? Who is the proper judge of the lawfulness of the established government? Are ministers of religion as interpreters of divine law to act as arbiters? If so, would not this lead to clerical interference with civil affairs? Is knowledge of the Scriptures sufficient to enable or entitle an ecclesiastic to pronounce on the constitution of commonwealths? If the existing form of civil commonwealth should be pronounced unlawful, who is to reform it? If the reform is not made by the established monarch, have the subjects singly, collectively, or through representatives, the right to resist, rebel, and take the law into their own hands? etc. Thus Cartwright, while he fain would divest his Puritan programme of political elements, shows clearly that he cannot do so, that they are inherent in his outlook, and that in certain circumstances, *e.g.* when the English civil

government assumed a form that was considered unlawful by the Puritans, the Cartwrightian might conceivably turn critic or even rebel.

We take, however, Cartwright's disclaimer as sincerely meant and may read into his unwillingness to enter the political field the influences of the Renaissance, Anabaptism, and the special circumstances of the English Reformation.

(i) The Reformation was not all novelty. In much it was a throw-back to mediaevalism. This was so in the sphere of Reformed politics. The theological politics, with theocratic notions and appeals to Scripture, were revived in support of the new nation-states. Under Renaissance influences these mediaeval conceptions and usages had been on the wane in the domain of politics. Cartwright therefore may be regarded more as an adherent of the Renaissance than as a Reformer in his first political pronouncement. It was the business of philosophers, not of divines, to deal with politics.

(ii) Certain phenomena connected with the beginnings of the Reformation had made it injudicious or delicate to meddle with politics. The political extravagances of the Anabaptists had made it appear that the revolt from Rome was also a political revolution and had inspired such reformers as Luther and Calvin with a dread lest the religious principles of the Reformation should be applied by extremists to purposes of civil disintegration. Calvin and his followers were exceedingly anxious to dissociate themselves from such extremists and both French Huguenot and English Puritan resented any insinuation that they

represented destructive Anabaptist tendencies. Cartwright frequently denied the imputation with which Whitgift so persistently charged the Puritan movement, and probably it was the desire to keep his cause unsullied by even the suspicion of subversive political designs that moved him to declare himself a divine who was concerned with purely religious and ecclesiastical problems.

(iii) There was special need for Cartwright to walk warily, for the peculiar nature of the English Reformation made it impossible for a dissenting movement that had the slightest appearance of political intention to succeed. The initiating factors in the Reformation in Germany and Switzerland were more purely doctrinal and religious than in Scotland, where at first it was largely a political anti-French movement, or in England, where it was almost a Henrician affair to begin with. Henry VIII and his Parliament imposed the Reformation upon the English people and gave it the character of a civil proceeding. First came the separation from Rome, then the forces that made the separation more and more Protestant. On the accession of Elizabeth the monarch and Parliament re-established the Church on anti-Papal lines and gave it its constitution. The Elizabethan settlement was in the main a civil affair. The chief moulder of the Anglican Church was the Queen herself. Any attempt to reform the Church was therefore likely to be regarded as involving opposition to the policy of the State and its head. Besides, the Queen was the declared governor of the English Church and firmly believed in her supremacy in ecclesiastical as well as

civil causes. The Papal Bull of 1570 and the massacre of St Bartholomew made it particularly desirable that any religious propaganda should not have political implications. It may be justifiable to call Wycliffe and Huss political agitators rather than religious pioneers,¹ and even of Knox it may be said that he was a political as well as a religious reformer, but it must have been obvious to a man like Cartwright that he was not contending for the Protestant religion and national liberty against a foreign or an intestine foe, that his monarch and his State were not enemies of the Reformation, that the circumstances in England were different from those in France, Scotland and the Netherlands, and that he was freed from the necessity, under which his fellow-Calvinists in those countries lay, of being politically aggressive. Nevertheless, Cartwright's lectures in Cambridge had already raised the cry that both Church and State were endangered by his teaching, *e.g.* William Chaderton complained to Cecil of the attempt "to overturne and overthrow all ecclesiasticall and civill governance that now is".² Accordingly Cartwright felt bound when defending the *Admonition* in 1573 to make it clear that politically he was content with things as they were.

Cartwright's intentions were doubtless sincere. He had no mind to condemn or subvert the existing civil government. From the first, however, his opponents regarded his assertions as "repugnante to the state of the Commonwealth"³ and it appears indubitable to us that they had sufficient ground for their charge

¹ Hearnshaw, 25.

² *S.P.T.C.* 28.

³ *Ibid.* 46.

that his teaching had political implications and that the chief reason for their attitude was that his view of the relation between Church and State was different from that held by the Elizabethan authorities. They believed that Church and State were but one society in two aspects and that an attack on one involved the other: Cartwright propounded the view that Church and State were separate societies and that his attempt to reform the Church of England in no wise reflected adversely upon the existing civil government. We shall therefore proceed to examine the Puritan's view of the relationship between the ecclesiastical and civil governments, the so-called two-kingdom theory.

Chapter Two

THE TWO-KINGDOM THEORY

THE distinction between Church and State is expounded by Cartwright when he deals with two questions, (i) the magistrate's authority in ecclesiastical causes, and (ii) the performance of civil offices by ecclesiastical persons. His conclusions are "that as wel in the decision of the doctrine, as in the choise of the variable ceremonies of the church, the principal authority belongeth unto the ministry",¹ and "that it is unlawful in an established estate of the church that a minister of the church should bear civil office".²

Cartwright sets forth a *prima facie* distinction between Church and Commonwealth by pointing out that a man who by excommunication is separated from the Church does not necessarily lose his citizenship in the State, that the civil magistrate may "by bannishment cut of a man from being a member of the commonwealth: whome the church can not by and by cast owt by excommunication", that a delinquent who has lost both ecclesiastical and civil privileges may, on repentance, be restored to church membership without being reinstated as a member of the commonwealth, and that "infidels under a Christian prince, may, until such tyme as they refuse instruction, be members of the commonwealth: yet are they not therefore members of the church".³

¹ *The Rest*, 170.

² *Ibid.* 31.

³ *Ibid.* 152.

These facts, Cartwright holds, are sufficient to prove that Church and State are not one. "If the church and commonwealth were (as he [Whitgift] saith) under a Christian Prince al one: it should folow, that whosoever is a part of one, should needes be a part of the other: and contrawise, whosoever is cut of from one, must be cut of from the other."¹ As the distinction pointed out by Cartwright was in general but loosely made and, if systematically analysed and more widely applied, might seem to run counter to the principles of the Elizabethan religious settlement, Cartwright had to marshal the weight of his argument in favour of the view that Church and State should be two self-sufficient complete and distinct, but related, societies.

(a) He claims for his conception the *imprimatur* of Christ. "Our Saviour Christ, having the spirit withowt measure, refused as a thing unmete for his ministry, the office of a Iudg."² He uses as a proof-text Christ's answer to the request, "Master, bid my brother divide the inheritance with me", viz. "Man, who made me a judge or a divider over you?" (Lu. xii, 14). He deduces from this saying that ministers should not intermeddle in the judgment of civil causes and that ecclesiastical persons should not be magistrates, and utters a warning against the Anabaptist inference that Christians should have no magistrates.³ He also makes much of the passage following upon the ambitious petition of Zebedee's wife for her sons, in which Christ exhorts the disciples not to exercise dominion as the princes of

¹ *The Rest*, 152.

² *Ibid.* 30.

³ *W.W.* III, 409.

the Gentiles do, but to aim at the greatness of service (Mt. xx, 25 ; Mk x, 42 ; Lu. xxii, 25). Cartwright infers that here Christ "putteth a difference between the civil and ecclesiastical function" and "placeth the distinction of them in two points, whereof the one is in their office, the other is in their names and titles".¹ He meets the difficulty in the case of Christ whipping the traders out of the Temple precincts by stating that Christ's action was singular and did not constitute a precedent for the mingling of spiritual and worldly functions in His ministers.² It did not square with his *a priori* theory and had to be explained away. It was therefore declared irrelevant because it was extraordinary. The general principle underlying the distinction between Church and State is held to be expressed in the refusal of Christ as a minister of the Gospel to intermeddle in civil affairs and His statement "My kingdom is not of this world" (Jo. xviii, 36).³

(b) Cartwright adduces precedents from the Old Testament in support of his theory. Jehoshaphat's appointment of separate officials to take charge of "all matters of the Lord" and "all the king's matters" (2 Chron. xix, 11) is taken as a proof that the Holy Ghost makes a partition between religious and civil affairs.⁴ In answer to the objection that such prophets as Samuel exercised civil government and that Hebrew kings exercised spiritual jurisdiction, he categorically states that the examples are extraordinary and not to

¹ *Ibid.* I, 148. "This", says Whitgift, "is a note of your own devising."

² *Ibid.* III, 445. ³ *The Rest*, 2.

⁴ W.W. III, 301. *The Rest*, 153.

be taken, as Jewel and Whitgift had taken them, to justify the combination of civil and ecclesiastical government in one person, *e.g.*

Some sharper Adversary might here have objected: that Moses, David, and Salomon, being Princes in the moste flourishing estate of the church: did notwithstanding make church orders. Whereunto I answer, that they did so, partly, for that they were not kinges onely and princes, but also prophetes of god: partly, for that they had special and expresse direction therto from god by the prophetes: whereby they did even those thinges in the church, which, without such special revelation, was not lawful for the priestes themselves to have doen. And althowgh the truth of this answer be apparant: yet, that it may have the more authority, especially with the D[octo]r that tasteth nothing without this sauce: he may understand that it is M. Calvins answer of Moses and David, and that in this present cause now debated.¹

Thus Cartwright uses certain portions of the Old Testament to confirm his hypothesis, while those that do not harmonise with it are rejected as peculiar features of the Old Dispensation not applicable to his own age. "The examples in the Scripture", he writes, "of them which have borne both the charges [civil and ecclesiastical] are either before this order was established of god, or being since, were extraordinary."²

(c) The Apostolic Church also supplies illustrative material for Cartwright's argument. "The Apostles", he says, "indued with such glorious gifts, as are not now to be looked for, gave over the office of the Deaconship, as that which they were not, with the ministry of the word, able to exercise." This office

¹ *The Rest*, 166. Cf. *W.W.* I, 69; II, 358; III, 442.

² *The Rest*, 31. Cf. Travers, *Full and Plaine*, 81.

“was easier then the civil charge, which the Bishops take upon them, and for the kinde of Ministry more agreeable”. Therefore, *a fortiori*, ministers of the Gospel should not bear civil office.¹

(d) The post-Apostolic Church before, according to the Puritan point of view, it became corrupt, is alleged to have set its seal to the doctrine. “This mingling of estates”, says Cartwright, “is contrary to the practice of the elder church uttered boeth in Councils and fathers.”² He cites Ambrose, Augustine and others as divines who recognised the distinction in question.³ He lays great stress on the fact that Christian Emperors permitted the determination of doctrinal controversies, the making or abolition of ceremonies, etc., to ministers assembled in Councils. As against Whitgift he does not see in the Emperors’ confirmation or execution of the ordinances so made an argument for supreme Imperial authority.⁴ He refers to Ambrose’s refusal to suffer ecclesiastical affairs to be debated in the civil court, an example which, as Whitgift is quick to point out, was used by Papists, *e.g.* Harding, to undermine the authority of the civil magistrate in the Church.⁵

(e) Cartwright also invokes the authority of “the practise and iudgment of the godly learnedest of our time” against the mingling of the civil and ecclesiastical estates.⁶ He quotes apposite passages from the writings of Calvin, Beza, Martyr and Bucer.⁷

¹ *The Rest*, 30-1. *W.W.* III, 422. Cf. Travers, *Full and Plaine*, 83.

² *The Rest*, 31.

³ *Ibid.* 151, 156.

⁴ *W.W.* III, 304, 306.

⁵ *Ibid.* III, 308.

⁶ *The Rest*, 31.

⁷ *W.W.* III, 544-5.

After Calvin and Beza he deems in this respect Bucer "to be worthy of the cheif place: which affirmeth that the magistrate owght not to administer the discipline of the church".¹

Besides seeking support for his theory from ancient and modern authorities Cartwright definitely bases it upon rational principles.

He posits the principle of differentiation of function and purpose as one that naturally makes for efficiency. The minister's spiritual charge is so weighty that it is unmeet for him to meddle in civil affairs.² By talents and training ministers are the best judges of ecclesiastical affairs.³ The alternative commingling of functions leads to confusion as may be realised if we imagine a king or a mayor officiating in the pulpit and administering the sacraments or ministers serving as justices of the peace, commissioners, etc. Cartwright holds that the latter "deformity" is especially unnecessary seeing there are sufficient gentry and nobles to discharge these civil offices better than the ecclesiastical persons to whom they are committed.⁴ The civil and spiritual estates ought to be kept distinct because the minister's office, to use Cartwright's own summing up,

is of greater weight then the strongest bak can bear, of wider compass then the largest handes can faddam: a soldiaryfare that wil be onely attended upon: seing also it tendeth to the destruction of the body when one membre encrocheth upon the office of another: and that the civil Magistrate may by the same right invade the office of the Minister as he the office of the civil Magistrate.⁵

¹ *The Rest*, 168.

² *W.W.* III, 421.

³ *Ibid.* III, 310.

⁴ *Ibid.* III, 424.

⁵ *The Rest*, 30.

Thus argues the humanist who has come under the influence of Greek philosophy.

A fundamental reason for the recognition of Church and State as two distinct societies is, according to Cartwright, their difference in nature and end. The one is concerned with eternal life, the other with life in this world: "one onely respecting the lyfe to come, the other the commodities of this lyfe".¹ The regiment of the Church is spiritual, respecting the conscience and the inward man; that of the State has to do with the outward behaviour.² Cartwright does not deny that the civil magistrate should have a care for the salvation of the souls of his people: he manifests this in procuring wealth and quietness in this life, while "ecclesiastical governors have all their whole care set upon that only which pertaineth to the life to come".³ The difference in end is seen in the different forms of punishment used by Church and State respectively; the one seeks by reprehension, admonition and excommunication to bring the soul into willing obedience to God, the other uses coercive means to bridle the outward man.⁴ As Christ, the head of the Church, is the spiritual governor of it, it is meet that His church officers should be spiritual too; whereas the civil magistrate, although divinely appointed, is not appointed by Christ *qua* the Church's head and is therefore not a purely spiritual functionary.⁵ "The Ministers office", says Cartwright, "is onely in thinges that pertayn to god, which for a degree of excellency that they have in promoting our

¹ *Ibid.* 65.

² *W.W.* III, 416.

³ *Ibid.* III, 417.

⁴ *Ibid.* III, 416, 418.

⁵ *Ibid.* III, 419.

salvation more then other, the holy gost opposeth unto the Princes and commonwealth affaires.”¹

We should take particular note of the “degree of excellency” which Cartwright ascribes to the Church as an instrument of man’s salvation. He recognises degrees of reality and does not separate the sacred and the secular absolutely. Hence when Whitgift says that “civil offices are not to be counted worldly affairs, but heavenly and spiritual” Cartwright agrees, but points out that when compared with ecclesiastical offices they may be called secular, because together with the care of religion their end is to provide for “the things whereby we may quietly and commodiously live here, where the ecclesiastical offices are immediately and only bent to procure the glory of God and the salvation of men”.² The Puritan goes on to elucidate his idea of the holy by saying that all lawful callings are from God and ought to be referred to His glory, and that in a wide sense merchandise, husbandry and handicraft are heavenly and spiritual, as well as the civil offices for which Whitgift claims divine qualities. Thus Cartwright propounds the notion of relativity in connection with the divine right and nature of the State. He does not pronounce it utterly but only comparatively secular, while the Church’s vocation and nature are declared divine *par excellence*. “Civil governments”, he writes, “are not so highly, not so immediately referred unto the glory of god as are the ecclesiastical”,³ and in reply to Whitgift’s charge that he makes the civil magistrate profane he says “Not onely the high dignity of the

¹ *The Rest*, 30.

² *W.W.* III, 437.

³ *The Rest*, 7, 8.

civil magistrate but the moste basest handicraftes are holy, when they are directed to the honour of god: but to concludre thereof that they are not distinguished from ecclesiastical causes is to much unadvisednes".¹

It follows from the intimate relation between the Church and God's will that the Church is divine in a sense not applicable to the State, that it enjoys a priority to and superiority over the latter, and that it is complete, self-sufficient and free.

As the house is before the hangings and therefore the hangings which come after must be framed to the house which was before, so the church being before there was any commonwealth, and the commonwealth coming after must be fashioned and made suitable unto the church. Otherwise God is made to give place to men, heaven to earth, and religion is made (as it were) a rule of Lesbia, to be applied unto any estate of commonwealth whatsoever.²

So exalted is Cartwright's conception of the Church that at times he identifies it with the rule of God. "The church", he says, "is the foundation of the world, and therefore the common wealth builded upon yt, must be framed unto yt."³ It is an institutional expression of the divine will. It began before time in the secret designs of God; it will endure in its own self-fulfilment when the things of time have perished. "The cause why this world endureth", says Cartwright, "is for that the full number of the elect is not yet gathered: so that, as sone as they are assembled by the ministry of the church, there shall be forthwith an end of the world."⁴

The Church, being thus the embodiment and agent

¹ *Ibid.* 152.

² *W.W.* III, 189.

³ *The Rest*, 66.

⁴ *Ibid.*

of the unchanging will of God, must have an invariable and universal form of government. According to Cartwright's reading of Scripture the Presbyterian government is the one there prescribed and that must be the perpetual and immutable polity of the divine visible society which is the true Church. Civil government, on the other hand, is not necessarily of one divinely instituted type; it is alterable according to circumstances.

"God", says Cartwright, "hath left a greater liberty in instituting things in the commonwealth than in the church. For, forsomuch as there be divers commonwealths and divers forms of commonwealths and all good, it falleth out that the offices and dignities which are good in one commonwealth are not good in another; as those which are good in a monarchy are not good in aristocracy, and those which are good in aristocracy are not good in a popular state. But that cannot be said of the church, which is but one and uniform, and hath the same laws and form of government throughout the world. In commonwealths also there are conversions, one form being changed into another; which cannot be in the true church of God."¹

Thus Cartwright's doctrine of immutable uniformity implies the divine right of Presbyterianism and denies the divine right, or rather necessity, of monarchy.

In his exposition of the Presbyterian system he makes it clear that the Church and its officials are sufficient and complete, a perfect self-governing society, spiritually free and independent.

"As for the making of the orders and ceremonies of the church", he says, "they do (where there is a constituted and ordered church) pertain unto the ministers of the church, and to the ecclesiastical governors; and that, as they meddle

¹ *W.W.* II, 356.

not with the making of civil laws, and laws for the commonwealth, so the civil magistrate hath not to ordain ceremonies pertaining to the church.”¹

While Cartwright contends for the distinction between Church and State he does not divide them into two absolutely separate societies. There are vital and necessary bonds of relationship between them. In order to describe and explain these bonds he has recourse to the use of analogy in a way that reminds us that since the days of the Greeks political science has constantly resorted to the vocabulary of other studies, ethical, legal, biological, etc., for the elucidation of its problems.² Cartwright's reasoning is frequently analogical and by picturesque and concrete description he makes up for the lack of exact and abstract definition. The relation between Church and State is singularly difficult to define in precise logical or scientific terms, and when professed political students have deliberately sought to throw light upon it by analogical methods and means, we are not surprised that Cartwright, who refused to count himself a political scientist, dealt with it in a similar fashion. The chief analogy used by him in this connection is very interesting and important and from his point of view exceedingly apposite.

He likens Church and State to the twins of Hippocrates who were sick and well together. When one laughed the other laughed; when one wept so did the other. Thus the breaches of the commonwealth proceed from the hurts of the Church: the deficiencies

¹ *Ibid.* III, 295-6.

² Barker, *Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*, 6 n.

of the one produce deficiencies in the other: the commonwealth will not flourish until the Church is reformed.¹ Whitgift, who grants the interdependence of Church and State, suggests that the Elizabethan Church must be in a very healthy condition seeing England flourishes so well, but Cartwright insinuates that there are still divers cracks in the commonwealth which will not be remedied until a further reformation in the Church is effected.² This Hippocratic analogy implies two organic bodies—*societates perfectae*—bound together by a principle of reciprocity. As the Church needs the State so the State needs the Church and both have duties to the other. We shall deal more fully later on with the nature of the magistrate's duties and rights in relation to the Church. Suffice it meanwhile to point out that Cartwright believes that the Church depends upon the State. He affirms that the civil magistrate is more necessary to the Church than the sun is to life.³ "We allow", he writes, "of commonweals, as without which the church cannot long continue",⁴ and declares himself opposed only to those civil governments that are hostile to the government God has instituted for His Church.

If the Church needs the State much more does the latter need the Church. Commenting on Proverbs viii, 15: "By me [*i.e.* the word of God] kings reign, and princes decree justice", Cartwright says that if wisdom or God's word is despised or abridged of a free and full course, princes, magistrates and their

¹ *W.W.* 1, 23.

³ *W.W.* 1, 19.

² *Ibid.* *Second Replie*, 4.

⁴ *Ibid.* 1, 105.

commonwealths go to wreck or decay. The want of the word of God produces a corresponding want of prosperity in the State. He illustrates his point by reference to non-Christian States which flourished for a while but because they lacked the blessing of a Christian Church did not endure.¹ He cites Isaiah lx, 12: "For the nation and kingdom that will not serve thee [he assumes that Christ and His Church are implied] shall perish", and holds that on the other hand the full and whole placing of Christ in His throne is the perpetual stay of princes in their seats.²

Cartwright has no scientific theory of the relation between Church and State; he does not entertain any specific psychological or biological conception to explain the interaction; he does not liken the nexus to that between body and soul or to that between volition and action, but he indicates by his Hippocratic analogy that there is a real organic channel of influence between two vital entities and is more concerned to show that the Church does affect the State and that the *modus operandi* lies in the agencies of the Presbyterian discipline. In a later age he would doubtless have agreed with Mill that political ethology cannot be separated from the science of civil government,³ and while disagreeing with the view of Sidgwick that the Church must be in harmony with the existing social and political order, he would have recognised with this modern philosopher the boons the Church can confer upon the State.⁴ The benefits are primarily of a moral and spiritual kind, but the

¹ *Ibid.* I, 24.

² *Ibid.* I, 25.

³ Sidgwick, *Elements of Politics* (1891), 5.

⁴ *Ibid.* 558.

regeneration of heart effected by the Church manifests itself socially and politically. True religion in the soul expresses itself in good citizenship, and loyalty to God and His laws produces the character and conduct that redound to the weal of society. Further, particular social evils are enumerated that would disappear under the action of the moral forces of the Church's holy discipline. Cartwright claims that crimes will be diminished if the eldership is established. "Wheroff cometh it", he asks, "that in so many excellent lawes provided against roges and beggers there are yet (to the manifest breach of the law of God and hasard off the commenwealth) such numbers? Ys it not heroff that the office off Deacons ...is abolished?"¹ "For whilest they conquere by the word", he writes of the Church's officers, "riote, adultry, covetousnes, pride, idlenes, etc., wherby diseases, beggery, translations off inheritance from the right heires, needles dearthes, seditions, rebellions (whereoff every one is an engin able to pull downe the commen wealth): they may be well called the horse and chariot of the commen wealth."² But he points out that the ecclesiastical officers who thus help the State are not to be counted officers of the commonwealth any more than the magistrate because of the assistance he gives to the Church is an ecclesiastical officer.³ As early as 1570 Cartwright was conscious that the welfare of the State depended upon the proper and efficient exercise of ecclesiastical government and emphasised the point in a letter to Cecil:

¹ *Second Replie*, Epistel, sig.)(X) iii verso.

² *Ibid.* 420.

³ *Ibid.*

“Si causa justa sit, si ecclesiae necessaria, si sine ea respublica solvatur et partes ab in vicem dissiliant (quod quidem sine disciplina fieri necessum est) causa digna est, quam recipias, etc.”¹ It should be specially noted that the Presbyterian Church as advocated by Cartwright made it one of its chief aims to inculcate the spirit of obedience. A member’s duty was to obey the dictates of the Church as if these were the commands of God.² The influence of this principle upon the State—*prima facie* an inestimable boon—will fall to be considered more fully in a succeeding section.

In opposition to the current notion that the polity of the Church should be of the same kind as the form of civil government—a notion advocated by Whitgift to uphold a monarchical Episcopacy—Cartwright puts forward a doctrine of harmony between Church and State, which presupposes the priority and freedom of the former.

“M. Doctor”, he writes, “goeth about both to deceive himself and others too, in that he thinketh that the church must be framed according to the commonwealth, and the church government according to the civil government, which is as much as to say, as if a man should fashion his house according to his hangings, when as in deed it is clean contrary, that, as the hangings are made fit for the house, so the commonwealth must be made to agree with the church and the government thereof with her government.”³

Whitgift terms this dangerous doctrine.⁴ He argues that Cartwright calls the Apostolic Church, in respect of the people’s interest in it, popular, and in respect

¹ *S.P.T.C.* 428.

² *Full and Plaine*, 185.

³ *W.W.* III, 189.

⁴ *Ibid.*

of the ministers and elders, aristocratic, that therefore the framing of the civil government to that of the Church means for Cartwright the overthrow of monarchy and the institution of a popular and aristocratic State,¹ and invokes Scripture to prove that men ought to be loyal to kings and that commonwealths are also churches of God.² He cannot conceive the coexistence of several kinds of government in one realm, seeing God has committed the chief care of both Church and State to one person.³ Cartwright contends that the notion that the church government should be of the same kind as the civil, being incompatible with the liberty of the Church, is absurd.⁴ He holds that Whitgift has taken his house-and-hangings analogy too literally. He did not mean that the form of civil government must be made the same as the ecclesiastical: "to be framed according to is not all one as to be made the same with". He protests that he does not mislike the present civil government,⁵ and that the abolition of Episcopacy would not hurt it at all.⁶ His point is that the constitution of the State must be consistent and harmonise with that of the Church. Whereas a modern believer in the omnicompetent State would say that the Church must be in harmony with the social and political order and that when it collides with the views of the State it must be corrected or suppressed,⁷

¹ *W.W.* III, 181, 192-3, 357.

² *Ibid.* III, 192-3.

³ *Ibid.* III, 182.

⁴ *Second Replie*, Note of errors and corruptions of Whitgift. *The Rest*, 59.

⁵ *The Rest*, 64-5.

⁶ *W.W.* II, 398.

⁷ Sidgwick, *op. cit.* 558.

Cartwright would emphasise the need to make the State—no matter whether its form of government be monarchical or mixed—consistent with and subservient to the divine form of government prescribed for the Church. The civil institutions must be accommodated to and must not clash with the government of the free, prior, eternal Church of God. The hangings must be adapted to the house and not *vice versa*.

One of the difficulties connected with the two-kingdom theory is the determination of the line of demarcation between the ecclesiastical and civil spheres of jurisdiction. Cartwright recognises the existence of this debateable land and suggests that in certain cases, *e.g.* matrimonial, the jumbling of jurisdictions would be prevented if ministers were consulted even when the judgment is allowed to pertain to the magistrate. The Church's representatives would help to decide when contracts and divorces were lawful.¹ They would serve as interpreters of the law of God, which it was the duty of the State to enforce.

"Although", says Cartwright, "it appertain to the church and the governors thereof to shew out of the word of God which is a lawful contract or just cause of divorce, and so forth, yet the judicial determination and definitive sentences of all these do appertain unto the civil magistrate. Hereunto may be added that all their punishments almost are penalties of money, which can by no means appertain to the church, but is a thing merely civil."²

The relation of the godly magistrate to the Church is affected by Cartwright's theory of coordinate

¹ *W.W.* III, 426.

² *Ibid.* III, 267.

jurisdiction. The Puritan holds decided views on the subject. These run counter to Whitgift's view that the prince delegated his authority in ecclesiastical affairs as he did to civil judges and lawyers in civil affairs without abridging his own supreme authority.¹ Cartwright's high conception of the Church constrains him to regard the monarch's function in relation to it as chiefly that of a servant of God. It is the magistrate's privilege to have particular duties towards the Church, but these duties are regarded as payable to God.

"It is true", says Cartwright, "that we ought to be obedient unto the civil magistrate which governeth the church of God in that office which is committed unto him and according to that calling. But it must be remembered that civil magistrates must govern it according to the rules of God prescribed in his word, and that as they are nurses so they be servants unto the church, and as they rule in the church so they must remember to subject themselves unto the church, to submit their sceptres, to throw down their crowns, before the church, yea, as the prophet speaketh [Is. xlix, 23], to lick the dust of the feet of the church. Wherein I mean not that the church doth either wring the sceptre out of the princes' hands, or taketh their crowns from their heads, or that it requireth princes to lick the dust of her feet (as the pope under this pretence hath done), but I mean, as the prophet meaneth, that whatsoever magnificence, or excellency, or pomp, is either in them, or in their estates and commonwealths, which doth not agree with the simplicity and (in the judgment of the world) poor and contemptible estate of the church, that they will be content to lay down."²

¹ *W.W.* III, 310.

² *Ibid.* III, 189. Travers says that the Discipline is not left to the magistrate but is appointed by God: *Full and Plaine*, 6.

In this important passage Cartwright proclaims the sovereignty of God and the duty of earthly monarchs to obey His commands as given in Scripture, and accordingly to yield allegiance to the Church prescribed by God in His Word. This means for Cartwright the submission of civil magistrates to the Presbyterian Church. He cites the exaggerated rhetorical language of Isaiah to show the absolute devotion that is required, but lest he may be regarded as an advocate of the abject subjection of kings he expressly disclaims any Hildebrandian pretensions and repeats his doctrine of harmony between civil and ecclesiastical purposes. After Whitgift had pointed out that this pronouncement attacked the freedom of the State and the absolute authority of the civil magistrate and meant in practice the reign of clericalism and the subordination of kings to seniors, Cartwright felt obliged to deny the implications. He does not mean that princes must literally throw down their crowns before the eldership: he does not dislike the existing form of civil government: but withal he is constrained by his belief in the sovereignty of God and in the Church as a divine institution to reaffirm the limitation of the civil magistrate's authority.

Besides being an earthly ruler the godly magistrate is a member of the Church and as such subject to the ordinary ecclesiastical discipline. "That princes", says Cartwright, "should be excepted from ecclesiastical discipline and namely excommunication, I utterly dislike."¹ Whitgift, ever jealous of the royal supremacy, believes that Cartwright's view entails

¹ *The Rest*, 65.

that the prince must be a member of a particular congregation and therefore subject to the seigniorship of the same, unless it please Master Pastor and the parishioners to make him an elder. Even then the minister would be his superior. But being a layman how can the prince be elected to an ecclesiastical office? It appears that he must be a mere servant subject to a new Presbyterian papalism. Cartwright however does not enter into the niceties of the civil magistrate's membership. His main object is to show that no godly magistrate can ride roughshod over the rules of the Christian Church and that as a member of the same he is as much amenable to correction as the meanest of his subjects. As a sinner he is to be treated in the same way as other sinners.

Travers argues that civil magistrates as spiritual beings are under the charge of the ecclesiastical magistrates. The latter rule by divine authority, represent the very person of Christ, and as such ought to be obeyed even by kings.¹

Whitgift contends that the magistrate is the head of the Church and in order to make this claim consistent with the headship of Christ distinguishes the visible external regiment from the spiritual. In the former there may be many pastors, archbishops, princes; in the latter Christ is the only pastor, the

¹ "Atque quum illi Iesu Christi non solum autoritate praesunt, sed ipsam quodammodo personam sustineant, quum nullo suo imperio, sed illius solo verbo & mandato omnia administrent: annon aequum est, illis vel summos magistratus & reges ipsos obtemperare? Huic enim omnes orbis Principes & Monarchae fasces suos submittere & parere decet, quem Deus regni sui haeredem, & coeli atque terrae Dominum constituit"—*Ecclesiasticae Disciplinae*, 142. *Full and Plaine*, 185.

only archbishop, the only prince, king and judge.¹ Cartwright, however, insists that "although the godly magistrate be the head of the commonwealth and a great ornament unto the church, yet he is but a member of the same".² His theory of two kingdoms demands one head for the Church and that is Christ. To allow the magistrate headship is to create a two-headed monster. The absurdity of Whitgift's claim appears the more obvious to Cartwright when he thinks of a State based on republican principles. "If the church be planted", he says, "in a popular estate: then forsomuch as all governe in comen and all have autoritie, all shall be head there and no body at all: which is another monster."³

Whitgift holds that Cartwright, by denying the right of the Christian magistrate to be the head of the Church, makes him no more than a Turk, or a Jew, or a Nero,⁴ but the Puritan repels the charge.⁵ He points out that as by vocation Christ has nothing to do with Caesar and his sword, so the magistrate has a divinely appointed sphere of his own.⁶ He calls the magistrate one of those means which serve God's Providence in the preservation of mankind. He is not an under or subordinate head of Christ but his authority comes simply and immediately from God even as Christ's does.⁷ Therefore although the magistrate is not the head of the Church he is an important member of the same, holding a unique position in relation to it. If Cartwright believes in

¹ *W.W.* II, 83-4.

² *Ibid.* I, 390.

³ *Second Replie*, 412.

⁴ *W.W.* III, 297-8.

⁵ *The Rest*, 168.

⁶ *Second Replie*, 417.

⁷ *Ibid.* 418.

the divine right of the Church rather than the divine right of kings, he also believes that the godly magistrate is a divinely ordained functionary, whose privileges and prerogatives take the form of certain divinely appointed duties rather than rights.

Cartwright assigns to the godly magistrate the high function of God's executioner. As it is the privilege of ministers to interpret God's laws, it is that of the magistrate to see that they are put into practice. Cartwright notes that Whitgift "hopeth to draw us into displeasure with the prince" because the Puritans are loath to give to the prince more authority than the word of God allows, and he points out that although the prince's authority be "the greatest in the earth, yet it is not infinite, but is limited by the word of God".

"The prince and civil magistrate", he continues, "hath to see that the laws of God, touching his worship, and touching all matters and orders of the church, be executed and duly observed, and to see that every ecclesiastical person do that office whereunto he is appointed, and to punish those which fail in their office accordingly."¹

Whitgift asks "What, no more but to see them executed? how differeth this from the papists?".² He would give the monarch *potestatem juris et facti*, absolute authority to make ecclesiastical laws as well as to apply them, and supremacy in both Church and State. "Yea", he writes, "I will go further with you: I make no difference betwixt a christian commonwealth and the church of Christ" and cites Jewel against Harding, Horne against Feckenham, and

¹ *W.W.* III, 295.

² *Ibid.*

Nowell against Dorman for confirmation of his absolutist views.¹

As the executioner of God's laws the Christian magistrate has power to initiate a religious reformation. It is indeed his duty to establish the true Church.² Cartwright freely acknowledges the part taken by Elizabeth in the reformation of the English Church and it is his desire that she will carry through a further reformation, *i.e.* establish Puritan Presbyterianism. He explicitly declares that the Presbyterian programme outlined in his six articles of 1570 should be promoted by all according to their several vocations, the magistrate by his authority, the minister by preaching, and all by their prayers.³ "We confess willingly", he writes, "that next unto the Lord God, every one of us is most deeply bound to her majesty, whom he hath used as an excellent instrument to deliver his church here out of the spiritual Egypt of popery."⁴ Elsewhere he attributes the deliverance from the hot furnace and the iron yoke of Egypt to the Queen along with the Council and Parliament, and expresses the hope that they will procure the removal of corruptions still existing and so introduce an ecclesiastical policy more akin to that of the Reformed Churches.⁵ He wishes that, if his *Reply* comes into the hands of any who have access to the Queen "the head of this commonwealth" and the Council "the shoulders thereof", it may inspire them to do more than bring the people out of Egypt. They have still to lead the people into the land of promise,

¹ *Ibid.* III, 312-13.

² *The Rest*, 159, 166.

³ *S.P.T.C.* 29.

⁴ *W.W.* III, 314.

⁵ *Ibid.* II, 471.

that is, to complete the Reformation by adding Presbyterianism to Protestantism. Thus Cartwright grants that the godly magistrate has authority, as an instrument of God, to initiate ecclesiastical changes, but he leaves undetermined such questions as, How is the magistrate to be moved to seek such changes? How is he to be directed to introduce the only proper and desirable reforms? How long are subjects obliged to tarry for the magistrate's initiative? etc.

Cartwright looks to the Old Testament for precedents, and commends the example of Josiah, Hezekiah and Jehoshaphat as kings who carried out thorough reforms, or of David who aimed at the substitution of the temple for the tabernacle.¹ When Whitgift asserts that Jehoshaphat's appointment of Levites and priests proves that he had chief authority in both spiritual and civil affairs, Cartwright says that this king merely used his princely authority to put in execution what the Lord commanded, and did not exercise an unconditioned ecclesiastical jurisdiction or use his individual discretionary powers.²

When the true Church is constituted or established it is the civil magistrate's duty to defend and maintain it.³ It may be established without the magistrate's aid but it cannot enjoy peace and quiet without him.⁴ He is sanctified by God to be a nurse to the Church⁵ and a preserver of its purity.⁶ Indeed, the "estate of

¹ *W.W.* I, 26.

² *Ibid.* II, 302. *The Rest*, 153.

³ "Sed magistratum etiam aliquid hic proprium & peculiare est, ut autoritate sua Ecclesiae statum constituent, & ex Dei voluntate constitutum conservent atque tueantur"—Travers, *Eccl. Disc.* 143 verso. *Full and Plaine*, 187.

⁴ *W.W.* I, 390.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.* I, 419.

religion maie be easilie pure with him: which can be hardly, or not without great daunger, pure without him".¹ It is his duty to defend the Church's liberty, to urge and, if necessary, constrain the people to give obedience to the pastors,² to compel papists and atheists, who are not members of the Church but are citizens of the State, to hear sermons, be examined and, if incorrigible, cut off,³ and to prevent the intrusion of non-members into Church affairs.⁴ When comparing the French Reformed Church with the Church of England Cartwright expresses his belief in State aid, saying that in the former "there were no such helps of magistrates and appointed stipends as, God be praised, we have".⁵ Although, however, Cartwright firmly believes that the godly magistrate brings a singular commodity to the Church he insists on the distinction between the civil and ecclesiastical societies and refuses to call the prince who is a benefactor to the Church an officer of the same.⁶

When the Church is diseased, when its representatives become corrupt or fail to carry out the ordinances of God, Cartwright looks to the godly magistrate to play the rôle of final arbiter who has authority to enforce the divine decrees and keep the Church in order.⁷ In contradistinction to the Papists who assert that whatever is determined by the clergy holds good

¹ *Second Replie*, 261. ² *W.W.* I, 418. ³ *Ibid.* I, 386.

⁴ *S.P.T.C.* 96. Travers says that the magistrate must provide educational facilities for the training of ministers: "Instituendae illis scholae sunt, adhibendi doctores"—*Eccl. Disc.* 75 verso.

⁵ *W.W.* I, 311.

⁶ *Second Replie*, 420.

⁷ *The Rest*, 166-7.

and must be maintained without enquiry by the prince, he says

but we say that if there be no lawful ministry to set good orders, as in ruinous decays and overthrows of religion, that then the prince ought to do it, and if when there is a lawful ministry it shall agree of any unlawful or unmeet order, that the prince ought to stay that order and not to suffer it, but to drive them to that which is lawful and meet.¹

Doubtless Cartwright would see no objection to this doctrine when the Church is under the sway of Romanism—then it agrees with his teaching that it is the magistrate's duty to initiate a reformation—but the case of a Protestant Church raises difficulties and apparent inconsistencies. If the Church is Presbyterian and its officials are the best interpreters of God's laws why should the magistrate's judgment overrule theirs? Are the pronouncements of a divinely instituted Presbyterian Church not infallible after all? If not, what guarantee is there that the magistracy is endued with infallibility? Whitgift conjures up the possibility of Presbyterians disagreeing among themselves and doubts whether Cartwright and his seniors would waive aside their peevishness and accept the final arbitrament of the magistrate for the settlement of their differences.² If the magistrate should denounce the Presbyterian platform advocated by Cartwright would he not decry him as a persecutor?³

When he speaks generally Cartwright speaks dogmatically on this question and says that if the

¹ *W.W.* III, 311.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* III, 300.

ecclesiastical officers, whose business it is to ordain ceremonies, etc., "make any orders not meet, the magistrate may and ought to hinder them, and drive them to better, forsomuch as the civil magistrate hath this charge to see that nothing be done against the glory of God in his dominion".¹ It is the duty of God's executioners to keep God's interpreters in order. When, however, Cartwright deals with particulars he takes away the absolutism that he has apparently allowed to the magistrate as final dictator. For instance, if the minister offend in his apparel by "going either dissolutely, or too exquisitely and delicately, then the magistrate may punish him according to the disorder wherein he faulteth",² but Cartwright will only admit that the magistrate may command a distinctive apparel for ministers and denies his right to prescribe popish vestments such as were used in the Church of England.³ The final arbitrament of the magistrate is thus accepted if he enforces the principles of Puritanism and so the Puritan is the final judge after all. He merely desires God's executioner to put what ought to be the opinions of God's interpreters into practice.

Cartwright also considers possible disorders in the election of ministers and the intervention of the magistrate for the purpose of restoring order.

"When as", he writes, "it is said that the church's consent should be had in the election of the minister, we do not deny the confirmation of the elections unto the godly civil magistrate, and the disannulling of them, if the church in choosing, and the ministers in directing, shall take any unfit

¹ *Ibid.* III, 296.

² *Ibid.* II, 17.

³ *Ibid.* II, 17, 69.

man; so that yet he do not take away the liberty from the church of choosing a more convenient man.”¹

Whitgift points out the implications of this doctrine, viz. that Cartwright relinquishes his opinion that the so-called Apostolic rule is absolute and perpetual or that he dissembles with the magistrate, that no provision is made for the rectification of disorder if the magistrate is ungodly or for the preferring of a requisition to the magistrate to intervene, “for who will complain of him whom the people do fancy, be he never so unmeet a person?” and that this course would occasion the magistrate infinite trouble.² Cartwright shows that the Church provides a rising pyramid of courts of appeal to which differences should be brought before a final appeal is made to the civil magistrate.³ These courts are the Consistory (Kirk Session), Presbytery, Synod, and National Assembly. Cartwright hopes that any disorders may be settled in these by persuasion and that it may not be necessary to employ the might of the sword: “For that which may be conveniently wonne with a worde shoulde not be gotten by the sworde: and that which maye be gotten to bee doone with conscience shoulde not be essaied by compulsion”.⁴ To Whitgift’s objection that the final appeal to the magistrate to compose the Church’s quarrels and tumults would mean that the Queen would be wholly occupied with the hearing and redressing of such matters,⁵ Cartwright answers that such a system of

¹ *W.W.* I, 419. *Second Replie*, 147.

² *W.W.* I, 424-5, 466-7.

⁴ *Second Replie*, 234.

³ *Ibid.* I, 376 n.

⁵ *W.W.* I, 377.

devolution as already obtains in civil affairs will suffice and that the Queen's representatives in the shires might exercise the ecclesiastical surveillance with her authority and in her name.¹

Cartwright's recognition of the civil authority in relation to the Church is of such a conditional nature as to render it suspect. He postulates fallibility on the part of the administrators of the Church and on the part of the magistrate, and attributes absolute sovereignty to God alone. He premises that God has decreed Presbyterianism as the only perfect and perpetual polity of the Church. Indeed, we may say that he holds that God is a Presbyterian. Accordingly he does not hesitate to proclaim his belief in the authority of the magistrate to further a reformation that sweeps away Romanism or Anglicanism and builds up a pure and free Presbyterian system, but in other circumstances—with an established Presbyterian Church—it is doubtful whether Cartwright would recognise the same need of appeal to the civil authorities. Even in the highest flights of his expressions of loyal submission we detect the significant qualification that the civil magistrate is to be obeyed "in the Lord and for the Lord", which might quite well mean, as long as he does not oppose Presbyterian interests.

"As for the magistrate and authority", says Cartwright, "we acknowledge the lawfulness, necessity, and singular commodity of it, we commend it in our sermons to others, we pray for them, as for those of whose good or evil estate hangeth the flourishing or decay of the commonwealth and church both. We love them as our fathers and mothers, we

¹ *Second Replie*, 234.

fear them as our lords and masters, and we obey them in the Lord, and for the Lord.”¹

In his doctrine of final appeal to the godly magistrate, although it is qualified by his belief in the *jus divinum* of Presbyterianism and the sovereignty of God, Cartwright approaches the conception of the omniscient State. Jealous as he is of the liberty of the Church as a *societas perfecta* he realises that in actual practice it may be fallible and imperfect. Above the ideal Church there is no court of appeal, but above the imperfect administration of the actual Church there must be the ultimate arbitrament and coercive jurisdiction of the ruler of the unified State. But it is apparent that to Cartwright this resort to the magistrate can never be satisfactory until the latter is a true Presbyterian servant and exponent of a Presbyterian God.

The problem of the two kingdoms was an old one in new circumstances.² It was latent in Christianity from the beginning, for when Christ said that His kingdom was not of this world and that men should render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's, He recognised a distinction between two spheres of influence, the exact nature of which He did not analyse and determine. The problem became affected by the entrance of the godly magistrate into the Church, and by the growth of the Empire and the Papacy. In the middle ages Christendom was regarded as a unity administered by two of God's agents, an Emperor

¹ *W.W.* I, 79.

² *V. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*, 160 ff.

and a Pope, and the relation between them gave rise to interminable controversy, now one and now the other claiming supremacy. The Reformation dawned with the problem of Church and State unsolved. But a new set of circumstances had arisen and nations and national churches had now to settle the matter. The theoretical distinction between temporal and spiritual affairs was recognised as it had always been, but the difficulty of determining their delimitations and the authorities who had the right of jurisdiction in the separate spheres was as hard as ever to solve. Henry VIII solved the matter to his own satisfaction by assuming the headship of Church and State, but Rome did not recognise his spiritual authority. The Roman Church asserted its spiritual authority over a Protestant like Knox but he repudiated its claim and attributed supreme jurisdiction to the State.¹ The growth of nationalism affected the problem. It was easier for a Protestant than a Romanist to recognise the conjoint temporal and spiritual authority of a Protestant monarch. If a subject differed in religion from his king he was faced with the dilemma—disloyalty to the heavenly or the earthly king. Calvin met the problem by stating that ecclesiastical government is entirely different from the civil: *quae tamen a civili prorsus distincta est*,² that Church and State are two distinct kingdoms: *quantum sit discrimen et qualis dissimilitudo ecclesiasticae et civilis potestatis*,³ and that the distinction rests upon the constitution of man: *duplex in homine regimen*.⁴ Cartwright, doubtless

¹ Knox, *Works*, IV, 445, 487.

² *Institutio*, lib. IV, c. xi, § 1.

³ *Ibid.* § 3.

⁴ *Ibid.* lib. IV, c. xx, § 1.

inspired not only by the words of Christ but also by the teaching of Cusa, Bucer, Calvin, and by the example of the Huguenots as they asserted themselves against a hostile king, accepts the distinction and elaborates his theory of the two kingdoms. His treatment of the problem is affected by the circumstances in which he lived. He sought to do justice to the authority of the State as well as the Church and to recognise the autonomy of both as well as the relationship between them. But his theory was bound up with notions of sovereignty and possibilities of clericalism that made it impracticable and particularly so in an age when uniformity was a virtue and toleration a crime.

Chapter Three

SOVEREIGNTY

CERTAIN aspects of his two-kingdom theory make it obvious that Cartwright did not believe in the absolute sovereignty of the earthly monarch. The Christian magistrate is a member of the Church; he is amenable to its discipline; his divine powers are chiefly duties; he dare not interfere with the autonomy of a lawfully constituted Church; he is an executioner of laws which he does not make, and although in certain cases he is the final arbiter of even ecclesiastical affairs he must judge according to the laws of God. When charged with abridging the magistrate's authority Cartwright replies: "I have browght it into no smaller roun then the word off God hath shut it, and the best learned and godliest writers both nwe (*sic*) and ould have plainly taught of yt".¹ The only absolute sovereign is God and the validity of all earthly authority depends upon its being in accord with the divine will and law.

The notion of an absolute sovereign State was alien to the mind of Cartwright. He looked beyond all mundane authority to the paramount God. His ideal of society was a theocracy. But it was a theocracy of a dual nature; it was the government of the Church which ought to be coterminous with the State by a

¹ *Second Replie*, Epistel, sig. XXX.

God supreme over both. His doctrine of an autonomous Church was incompatible with the modern doctrine of an omnicompetent State, such as was fostered by the Lutheran reaction against Rome, the revolt of Henry VIII, the growth of nationalism, and the explicit teaching of French politicians like Bodin. He was, however, unable to keep his mind uninfluenced by the dominant view of State supremacy, for it is apparent that his view of the final arbitration of the civil magistrate in cases of ecclesiastical error and disorder was a concession to the current conception of the sovereignty of the unitary State.

In Cartwright's opinion the monarchical form of government is not the only allowable one and consequently he does not regard kingship as such as invested with inalienable sovereign authority even of a kind that is qualified by the absolute sovereignty of God. Earthly monarchy is only "one off those governementes which God hath established and allowed by his word".¹ It is not necessarily perpetual and is therefore alterable.

"Although", says Cartwright in answer to Whitgift's assertion that monarchy is absolutely necessary in England, "I have shewed that I greatly allow of it, yet that yt is necessary and that the Prince and Parlement can not upon occasion alter yt, especially without breache off the lawe off God, which onely maketh the necessitie we speake of, ys an untrwth apparant to all that have ever tasted off holy or humane letters."²

The government that is not perpetual and absolutely necessary cannot claim an inherent right to absolute sovereignty.

¹ *Second Replie*, 579.

² *Ibid.* 604.

The question of sovereignty arises in Cartwright's discussion of the polity of the true Church. In his Presbyterian scheme the chief authority is not focussed in one person. Purely anti-monarchical in principle—so far as ecclesiastical government is concerned—he opposes both the Papacy and English Episcopacy. He advocates a system of representative government according to which sovereignty resides both in the members of the Church and in their representatives. The Presbyterian Church is a mixed state, a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy, sovereignty residing simultaneously as well as respectively in Christ the supreme Head, in the ministers and elders, and in the general membership.¹ Cartwright finds an "image" of this polity in the government of England—the Queen representing the monarchical principle, the Privy Council the aristocratic, and Parliament the democratic.²

The idea of popular sovereignty is enunciated by Cartwright with greatest emphasis in connection with the question of the election of the ministers of the Church. Besides being called by God and ordained by fellow Presbyters they are office-bearers who rule over their congregations in virtue of an authority that is delegated to them from below by the consent of the membership. Besides the alleged Scriptural sanction, found in particular in the *Acts* in the election of Matthias and of the Seven, Cartwright puts forward certain reasons "whereby the perpetual equity, reasonableness, and conveniency of this order, that the church should have a stroke in her ministers'

¹ *W.W.* I, 390.

² *Ibid.*

election, may appear".¹ He appeals to the important principle that the laws of a society should be the expression of the will of its constituent members.

"It is said among lawyers", he writes, "and indeed reason, which is the law of all nations, confirmeth it, *Quod omnium interest ab omnibus approbari debet*: 'That which standeth all men upon should be approved of all men'. Which law hath this sense, that, if it may be, it were good that those things which shall bind all men, and which require the obedience of all, should be concluded, as far as may be, by the consent of all, or at least by the consent of as many as may be gotten. And therefore it draweth much the obedience of the subjects of this realm, that the statutes, whereby the realm is governed, pass by the consent of the most part of it, whilst they be made by them whom the rest put in trust, and choose for that purpose, being as it were all their acts."²

Cartwright's view of the relation of consent to sovereignty should be of interest to the modern political scientists who regard sovereignty as practically equivalent to the ability to secure consent.³

Cartwright proceeds to uphold the theory of representative government by referring to the practice of it in municipal elections: "So is it also when the question is to choose the magistrate, mayor, or bailiff, or constable of every town".⁴ This is but one of the frequent references which were made by the Puritans to civic government as affording a parallel to ecclesiastical polity, and which point to the currency among them of the conception that the Church was akin to a circumscribed city-state.

The Puritan, however, argues that if it is expedient

¹ *W.W.* I, 369.

³ Laski, *op. cit.* 13, 14.

² *Ibid.* I, 370.

⁴ *W.W.* I, 372.

and reasonable to have the people's will expressed in civic elections it is all the more fitting that the members of the Church should be governed by those who really represent them, because of the greater importance of the function of the spiritual rulers.

"Which things", he says, "if they have grounds in civil affairs, they have much better in ecclesiastical. For it is much more unreasonable that there should be thrust upon me a governor of whom the everlasting salvation or damnation both of my body and soul doth depend, than him of whom my wealth and commodity of this life doth hang; unless those upon whom he were thrust were fools, or madmen, or children, without all discretion of ordering themselves."¹

Here we note the influence of Cartwright's distinction between the ends of Church and State and the emphasis laid by him upon the postmortal as compared with the present life. The supreme value of the future life is used to lend weight to the argument that immortal souls should have a sovereign choice in the appointment of those who were to determine their ultimate destiny. Cartwright does not seek to harmonise this notion with the Calvinistic ideas of election and predestination, and *prima facie* it seems that in his politics he was less of a Calvinist than in his theology. In any case it is interesting to observe the introduction of eternity into the field of political thought.

Whitgift marshals an imposing array of arguments against the principle of democratic sovereignty, or "popularity" as he calls it. The people are too rude and ignorant; they are moved by affection rather than

¹ *Ibid.*

enlightened conviction; they are unable to judge of the fitness of their superiors; their choice of pastors would make the latter too dependent upon their fickleness; their inability to reach a unanimous finding would leave churches destitute of pastors; contention and division would be inevitable; as Calvin has pointed out, sedition would readily follow popular rule; the realm would be filled with anabaptists, libertines, etc.¹ Whitgift shows that the general will of the people is not necessarily coincident with their real will and that what they choose is not always best for themselves;² he fears that the transference of the principle of popular consent as taught by Cartwright from the Church to the State would be fraught with danger to the existing civil constitution;³ and he argues that Parliament is already sufficiently representative of the people and that, as it has sanctioned the present mode of ministerial election in the English Church, the whole realm is therefore bound to allow what is really the expression of its own will.⁴

Cartwright repudiates the charge of "popularity".⁵ As was natural in a disciple of Calvin he held no inflated opinion of the wisdom of the multitude. Bancroft afterwards commented on the fact that the Puritans laid less and less stress upon the rights of the people until these were reduced to the mere absence of dissent from the proceedings of their officials and the Presbyterial courts, saying that Cartwright "by snatches here and there doth so powder his matters,

¹ *W.W.* I, 463 ff.

² *Ibid.* I, 371.

³ *Ibid.* I, 372.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.* I, 42.

that in effect he giveth them [the people] onely an empty bottle to play with".¹ Bancroft also pointed out that the Barrowists and other Separatists with strong Congregational leanings, while taking Cartwright's arguments in behalf of the people's rights, railed against him for not incorporating these in his Presbyterian scheme, "leaving them nothing but the smoakie wind of election onely"² and giving all power to office-bearers and courts.³

Cartwright indeed recognises the advantage of popular representation as a check on a self-interested oligarchy;⁴ he believes that the people are more likely to love and respect ministers chosen by themselves than those thrust upon them;⁵ he denies that he advocates the application of the principle of popular election to all civil appointments and affirms that he refers merely to ecclesiastical government and that things lawful in one estate may be unlawful in another;⁶ and in opposition to Whitgift's contention that the people choose the bishops because the latter are established by Parliament, the assembly representative of the whole realm, he writes:

It is our controversie whether the parliament have doon well in establishing off suche an order off making ministers and whether this egge off the bishoppes election laied in popery could by the sitting uppon off the Parliament (although never so godly) leese the poysoned nature it had before.⁷

There are certain elements in the Cartwrightian scheme that prevent the sovereignty of the people from being undiluted mob rule. One is the franchise

¹ Bancroft, *Survey*, 346.

² *Ibid.* Barrow, *Discovery*, 195.

³ Bancroft, *Survey*, 347. ⁴ *Second Replie*, 228. ⁵ *W.W.* 1, 374.

⁶ *Second Replie*, Epistel, sig.)()(verso.

⁷ *Ibid.* 226.

qualification required of the consenting or voting constituency; another is the fact that Cartwright consistently divides and distributes the sovereignty between the democratic, the aristocratic and the monarchic factors in the mixed polity which he deems the best.

All and sundry are not recognised as fit to exercise the franchise. Votes are not to be given to women or minors, for "all men understand that where the election is most freest and most general, yet only they have to do which are heads of families".¹ Cartwright would identify the electorate with the full membership of the Church which he defines as "The numbred off those which doo professe the gospell off Christ".² He proceeds to demolish Whitgift's identification of Church and parish, in order to eliminate the ignorant and unfit from the privileges and responsibilities of government:

For as in the time off persecution, when there is no Christian magistrates, the churche severeth those, which being off the parishe are none off the church: so when there is a Christian magistrate, he owght to provide that those which are not off the churche thrust not in them selves into suche affaires as (because they are none off the church) they have nothing to do with.³

"Wee doe not permitte", he says, "either examination or election off the ministers to every multitude and blinde assemblie: but unto those onely whiche make an open and cleare profession off the trewth."⁴ He holds that the enfranchised are not to be regarded as fools, madmen, or children, upon

¹ *W.W.* I, 456.

³ *Ibid.*

² *Second Replie*, 146.

⁴ *Ibid.* 130.

whom the will of others is to be imposed, but believes that in virtue of the spiritual endowment which fits them for membership in the Church they are capable of exercising their rights in the autonomous government of the same:

For they of the church of God, although they be called sheep in respect of their simplicity and harmlessness, yet are they also, for their circumspection, wise as serpents in the wisdom especially which is to salvation; and, how vile account soever you will make of them, they are the people of God, and therefore spiritual and forthwith those of whom St Paul saith "The spiritual man discerneth all things".¹

It should also be noted that the votes of the majority carry.²

We now pass to the aristocratic side of the mixed ecclesiastical state favoured by Cartwright. Referring to the Apostolic Church which he took as model he says: "The state off the beste did beare the greateste rule".³ "Tell the Church" means "Tell the office-bearers", that is, the minister and elders in their corporate and official capacity.⁴ The lion's share of the sovereignty distributed between the members and their representatives is given to the latter. They are the administrators and the executive. But their authority is exercised in a pyramidal hierarchy of courts, from Consistory to National Assembly, each with different powers, the highest court being that which represents all the congregations of the land. Appeals can be made from the lower to the higher. If, for instance, a particular congregation by a majority elect an unmeet pastor

¹ *W.W.* I, 372.

³ *Ibid.* 249.

² *Second Replie*, 147.

⁴ *S.P.T.C.* 208.

then the ministers and elders of the other churches round about should advertise first, and afterward as occasion should serve, sharply and severely charge that they forbear such election, or, if it be made, that they confirm it not by suffering him to exercise any ministry. And, if either the churches round about do fail of this duty, or the church which is admonished rest not in their admonition, then to bring it to the next synod.¹

Then Cartwright reaffirms his belief in the civil magistrate as the final arbiter, saying that if the appeal rest not in the highest synod "the prince or magistrate which must see that nothing in the churches be disorderly and wickedly done, ought to drive that church from that election to another which is convenient".² Thus the Puritan lays down a sufficiency of safeguards against the degeneration of the exercise of democratic rights into popular confusion.

Travers writes even more expressly than Cartwright concerning the merging of the people's sovereignty into that of their representatives by the principle of delegation. Incidentally he shows that he believes that monarchy is elective and that kings stand in the same relation to the people as the Presbyterian officials do to the members of the Church; both are responsible representatives. Significant is the emphasis he lays upon the fact that after their election by, or with the consent of, the people the representatives have a right to govern without a direct reference to their electors on every matter; here lies the possibility of tyranny and oligarchy. This important passage runs thus:

¹ *W.W.* 1, 375.

² *Ibid.*

For as in common welthes not only suche wher the people is to be made soveraigne, or a few, but also even wher the kingdome of one is to be established before it be confirmed all the power is in the peoples handes, who of ther free will choose magistrates unto them under whos authoritie they may after be governed: and afterwardes not all the people, but only the magistrates chosen by them administer and governe the affaires off the common wealthe; So it cometh to passe in the establishinge off the churche: So that when as yet ther were none set over them, all the authoritie was in all mens handes: but after that they had once given the helme into the handes off certen chosen men, this power no longer belonged unto all, but only to thos who wer chosen by them to steare and governe the churche off god.¹

This notion of delegated sovereignty is one of the principles to which a really democratic state takes objection and which it seeks to remedy by means of a referendum or an initiative; it was one of the features of Presbyterianism which the Congregational Separatists heartily disliked. It certainly was sufficient to prevent Elizabethan Puritanism from being regarded as sheer "popularity"; it implied, indeed, the right on the part of the people to elect their officials but also the duty of trustfully making an act of self-renunciation. "Antequam constituatur", to quote Travers's Latin version of the *Declaration*, "omne imperium penes populum est. . . posteaque non universa plebs sed a plebe delecti magistratus Reipublicae negotia administrant."²

¹ *Full and Plaine*, 55.

² *Eccl. Disc.* 41. Travers says that the people need elders to choose and examine fit men; the latter are presented to the Church for approval; then they are confirmed by the *ecclesiasticus senatus*. *Ibid.* 43 *verso*.

Cartwright also qualifies the authority of the State as the court of final appeal, and limits the scope of the aristocratic element in the officials and courts of the Church, by the third principle in the mixed ecclesiastical polity, viz. the supreme sovereignty of Christ as the Church's only Head.

"It is sufficient", he writes, "now to admonish you that, although it be granted that the government of one be the best in the commonwealth, yet it cannot be in the church. For the prince may well be monarch immediately between God and the commonwealth; but no one can be monarch between God and his church but Christ, which is the only Head thereof. Therefore the monarchy over the whole church, and over every particular church, and over every singular member in the church, is in Christ alone."¹

Whitgift sees in this doctrine a political principle of a dangerous kind. "T. C.", he writes, "doth but glance at the magistrate because he dare not speak plainly."² We are not so sure that Cartwright was deliberately aiming a covert blow at the existing monarchy, but it is obvious that it was not easy for him to make his doctrine of Christ's absolute sovereignty in the Church compatible with the claims of royal supremacy enunciated in the Elizabethan Settlement, and we must consider the way in which he tried to do so, and examine the collision that arose between the Puritans and their opponents over this question.

The conception of royal supremacy accepted in the Elizabethan Settlement was essentially that of Henry VIII, who, imposing his personal will upon the Parliament and Church of his reign, had himself

¹ *W.W.* III, 198.

² *Ibid.*

recognised by statute as the only supreme head on earth of the Church of England.¹ He rejected the claim of the Papacy to exercise jurisdiction over the English Church and virtually became the Pope of England himself, a lay Hildebrand believing in and practising absolute sovereignty in spiritual as well as in temporal affairs, and recognised by statute as the Church's supreme head—in terra ecclesiae Anglicanae & Hibernicae supremum caput.² The Henrician Act of Supremacy expressed a conception of royal sovereignty that prevailed throughout the reign of Edward VI, fell into abeyance in the reign of Mary, and was resuscitated on the accession of Elizabeth.³ Mary's Parliament declared that the title of supreme head of the Church of England never was nor could be justly or lawfully attributed to any king of the realm.⁴ The Elizabethan Act of Supremacy, however, revived all that was in the Henrician claim except the title of supreme head which was changed to supreme governor. This Act declared all ecclesiastical jurisdiction annexed to the Crown "by authority of this present parliament".⁵ Elizabeth's right to rule over the English Church thus rested upon a statutory basis, which may mean either that Parliament bestowed it upon her or recognised and declared it to be inherently hers as monarch. In any case the Elizabethan Church became a department or creature of the State, and Elizabeth jealously guarded her pre-

¹ 26 Henry VIII, c. i.

² V. Child, *Church and State under the Tudors*, 70, 76-8, 99, 104, 326, 332, 335, 339, 342, 346.

³ *Ibid.* 104, 113.

⁴ 1 & 2 Philip & Mary, c. viii, § 42.

⁵ 1 Eliz. c. i, § 17.

rogative as supreme governor against the demands of the Puritans and the intervention of Parliamentarians who favoured them. She exercised her authority either personally or, more generally, through the execution of specific statutes, *e.g.* the Act of Uniformity, and the administration of statutorily appointed agencies, *e.g.* the High Commission.

The oath incorporated in the Act of Supremacy (§ 19) for the better observation and maintenance of the same was designed *inter alia* to test and ensure the recognition of the Queen's temporal and spiritual sovereignty on the part of all ecclesiastical persons. As Cartwright and the other Puritan ministers were compelled to take this oath before they could hold office, we should particularly observe the terms of it. It runs thus:

I, A. B. do utterly testify and declare in my conscience, that the Queen's highness is the only supreme governor of this realm, and of all other her Highness dominions and countries, as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes, as temporal; and that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate, hath or ought to have any jurisdiction...and do promise that from henceforth I shall bear faith and true allegiance to the Queen's Highness, her heirs and lawful successors, and to my power shall assist and defend all jurisdictions...granted or belonging to the Queen's Highness....¹

It is conceivable that those who rigidly adhered, as the Puritans did, to the conception that Christ was absolute Head of the Church would find it impossible to take this oath. They believed in the monarchy of Christ; how could an earthly Queen share it with

¹ Child, *op. cit.* 387.

Him? They believed in an autonomous Church the sovereignty in which was shared by members, office-bearers and Christ; how could Elizabeth be supreme? They had no hesitation in denying the Headship of the Church to any magistrate; but in deference to objections such as theirs the Henrician term "head" had been changed into the Elizabethan term "governor"; was there any real difference in the distinction? Such questions as these were made easier for the Puritans to resolve by the interpretation officially put upon the words of the oath in the Queen's Injunctions and in the XXXIX Articles; for instance, in the XXXVIIth Article the meaning of the royal supremacy is analysed and elucidated. We believe that it was the authoritative interpretation thus expressed that enabled the Puritans conscientiously to take the oath and still believe in their own peculiar views of sovereignty, to take the oath and simultaneously believe in a self-governing Presbyterian Church.

Consider the XXXVIIth Article "Of the Civil Magistrate". It states categorically that the reigning monarch has "the chief Government" of all estates, ecclesiastical or civil, but follows this up with a significant explanation:

Where we attribute to the Queen's Majesty the chief government, by which titles we understand the minds of some slanderous folks to be offended; we give not to our Princes the ministering either of God's Word or of the Sacraments, the which thing the Injunctions also lately set forth by Elizabeth our Queen do most plainly testify; but that only prerogative, which we see to have been given always to all godly Princes in holy Scriptures by God himself; that is, that they should rule all estates and degrees committed to

their charge by God, whether they be Ecclesiastical or Temporal, and restrain with the civil sword the stubborn and evil-doers.

This gloss enabled men like Cartwright to take the oath of the Queen's supremacy without violating their conscience. The interpretation here given is in harmony with Cartwright's two-kingdom theory so far at least as the exclusion of the civil magistrate from the performance of the chief ministerial functions is concerned: it entails the recognition of the royal prerogative only so far as that is given to the civil magistrate by God and thus leaves room for further determination. It does not define the limitations set upon earthly monarchy by the supreme sovereignty of God or the absolute Headship of Christ over the Church. Accordingly, Cartwright could conscientiously and consistently take the oath and simultaneously affirm his favourite principles.

That Cartwright took the oath of supremacy several times and willingly is an indubitable fact. "To her Maiesties supremacie", he writes, "I have bene sworne (at the least) five or sixe times, and if there be doubt of any change of my judgement, I am ready to take th'oth againe."¹ He along with other prisoners expressly defines the Puritan attitude to the oath in a joint letter to Burghley (4 Dec. 1591) thus:

¹ *Apologie*, 1596, sig. C. *S.P.T.C.* 336. The only fault the Puritans found with the first of the three articles to which Whitgift demanded subscription, viz. the article stating that the Queen has and ought to have under God the sovereignty and rule over all citizens, was that it was superfluous, every ordained minister having already taken the oath of supremacy. *S.P.T.C.* 241.

There is never a one of us but hath bene sworn to her Majesties Supremacie, and some of us (upon occasions) divers times. And if we be doutd how we stand affected this time, notwithstanding we have given no cause (as we are persuaded) of that suspicion: yet to satisfie th'authority under which we live, we wilbe ready to take th'othe agayn. And notwithstanding some (not so well affected towards us, as we are towards them) doe suggest that we carrie some other interpretacion with us, then the meaning of the law is: yet have we verely no other, then all the reformed Churches have, in the dutifull acknoledgement of th'authority of their severall Magistrates, none other then her Majesties own admonicion in th'end of her injunctions, and the XXXVIIth article of the Convocation, and especially the most autentike and classical writers of this Church, both Bishops, Deanes and other men of note, [who] with privilege, with allowance, with oversight of the B.B. themselves, and finally with great commendacion of all, have written of that poynt.¹

This pronouncement meant, in brief, that the Puritans believed in a royal supremacy that was consistent with the absolute sovereignty of God. It meant that they would obey the laws of the land and be loyal to established institutions like the Church of England so far as they were compatible with the laws of God. To the mind of Cartwright, however, the laws of God prescribed the Headship of Christ and Presbyterianism. The former could easily be believed in along with the ambiguous or indeterminate royal supremacy, but how could belief in the *jus divinum* of Presbyterianism coexist with adherence to the existing Episcopacy? Cartwright's doctrine of a gradation of reality helped to meet the dilemma. The English Church as it existed had the *esse* of a true

¹ *S.P.T.C.* 471.

Church but could not have the *bene esse* until it became Presbyterian. Cartwright accordingly defended the *esse* and criticised those things that prevented the *bene esse*. Therefore he opposed the Separatists and also such men as Whitgift. But he and his fellows, while their judgment was in favour of Presbyterianism, were kept by their loyalty to the State as constituted and to the Queen's supremacy from putting Presbyterianism into practice by unconstitutional means. They wished the Queen and Parliament to establish the polity which they believed was the one that ought to be set up. They believed that the existing ecclesiastical system was sufficiently Christian to be accepted as an interim, that it would be disloyal to the royal supremacy for them to seek to subvert it, that meanwhile it was their duty to "tarry for the magistrate" until by the exercise of his prerogative he should erect the system of Church government which would better allow the sovereignty of Christ to be expressed. This pressure of two loyalties made the Puritans liable to be misunderstood; to be regarded on the one hand as seditious dissenters and on the other as inconsistent cowards. They were merely conformist idealists seeking to make their political allegiance to Elizabeth harmonise precisely with their spiritual allegiance to Christ.

It is not generally recognised that the Separatists held practically the same view of the royal supremacy as the Cartwrightian Puritans did. Barrow, for instance, explicitly acknowledged Elizabeth as supreme governor of the whole land "and over the Church also, bodies and goods".

"But", he says (24 March, 1586-7), "I think that no Prince, neither the whole world, neither the Church it self, may make any Laws for the Church other than Christ hath already left in his Word: yet I think it the duty of every Christian, and principally of the Prince, to enquire out and renue the Laws of God, and stir up all their Subjects to more diligent and careful keeping of the same."¹

Penry also recognised the Queen's supreme authority in ecclesiastical as well as in civil affairs but observed that it was limited by the laws of God.² If such opinions could be conscientiously held by the Separatists who believed even more than Cartwright did in the spiritual independence of the Church, we are not surprised that the Puritan Presbyterians who worked for a reformation of the State Church from within the fold held similar views.

To exemplify the Puritans' profession of loyalty to Elizabeth we may refer to Cartwright's repudiation of the charge that he had written undutifully regarding the excommunication of the Queen and that he was in a plot for the execution of the same.³ According to his theory princes should not be exempt from excommunication if they deserved it,⁴ but that did not mean that he thought that Elizabeth should actually be brought under the censures of the Church. We may also cite his letter to Hatton in which he meets "the suspition of Disloyaltie" at length, denying the charges that he favoured "the overthrowe of all good goverment in the Comon wealth", that he misliked "of Magistrates and especially of mon-

¹ *The Examinations of Henry Barrow, John Greenwood, and John Penry*, n.d. 13.

² *Ibid.* 39.

³ *S.P.T.C.* 350-1, App. xxxi.

⁴ *Ibid.* 95.

arkes", and that he liked "of equalitie of all estates and of a hedles rulynge of the unrulie multitude". He wishes that the Queen knew his real principles and did not believe what is falsely attributed to him.

"So", he writes, "shall I be suer to be eased of the slanderous surmyse of my disloyaltie to her maties estate and to the common wealthe: likewise of my love to puritanisme and Church confusione: the contrary of booth which I doo most earnestlie protest, with this offer, that if either be proved against me, I will refuse no extreamitie to be practised upon me."¹

The Puritans sought to display their loyalty to the established authority by their refusal to further their scheme by unconstitutional methods. By direct and indirect means they tried to enlist the royal favour; they made a strong effort to secure Parliamentary recognition and sanction; they would not cut the Gordian knot by refusing like the Separatists to tarry for the magistrate; they took the greatest care to make it clear in the articles of subscription appended to their Book of Discipline that they merely expressed their judgment when they declared their approval of the Presbyterian polity embodied in the Book, and that they promised to put into practice only such parts of it as were consistent with the peace and the laws of the realm.²

Although the Privy Council in 1592 were apparently satisfied with Cartwright's attitude to the royal supremacy and were pleased that the charges of sedition and disloyalty brought against him should not be further proceeded in,³ that merely meant that he had not legally violated the constitution and done

¹ *S.P.T.C.* App. xiv. ² *Ibid.* 248, 261, etc. ³ *Ibid.* 358.

despite to Elizabeth's sovereignty. But he was not given liberty to set up his Presbyterian polity. The authorities were still of opinion that it was politically dangerous. Men like Bancroft and Sutcliffe were at the moment composing books to prove this point. They showed, for instance, that many of the Separatists were carrying Cartwright's principles to their logical conclusion by making Church and State two absolutely independent kingdoms, that where Presbyterianism was powerful enough it tended to become Hildebrandian, producing a clerical domination over both Church and State, and that thus the sovereignty of the civil magistrate was endangered.

Elizabeth herself was the greatest enemy of the Puritans and it was chiefly due to her that Puritanism failed in her reign.

"Ther is risen", she wrote to James VI of Scotland (6 July, 1590), "bothe in your realme and myne a secte of perilous consequence, suche as wold have no kings but a presbitrye, and take our place while the enjoy our privilege, with a shade of Godes word, wiche non is juged to folow right without by ther censure the be so demed. Yea, looke we well unto them."¹

This is a significant declaration and particularly so as it was made by one monarch to another. It reveals the political insight of Elizabeth and shows that she was acutely alive to the political danger-point in Presbyterianism. That was the idea of sovereignty, so far as it related to ecclesiastical affairs, which according to the Puritans resided in people, presbyters, and Christ by *jus divinum* and in the civil magistrate

¹ *S.P.T.C.* 343.

only so far as his authority was compatible with that *jus divinum*. Elizabeth saw that although the Puritans were conscientiously able and willing to take the oath of royal supremacy, they did so with an interpretation which implied the autonomy of a divinely appointed Church and the absolute sovereignty of Christ, and that in practice this would naturally mean a limited monarchy. To establish Presbyterianism, therefore, meant for Elizabeth an act of self-abnegation, the allowance to a Church of prerogatives which she claimed as her own. Besides, she was aware of the danger of clericalism and believed that a Church which held the view that the civil magistrate was censurable, even excommunicable, would not refrain from exercising its discipline upon him if it were recognised as the State Church and its ministers felt in duty bound to do so. As the Cartwrightians would and could not presbyterianise the Church of England unless by constitutional means, Elizabeth had to do with potential dangers. For instance, Cartwright criticised the type of service that was held in the royal chapel, "which with all humble submission and reverence", he wrote, "I beseech her majesty duly to consider",¹ but if the Puritans had been granted the ecclesiastical jurisdiction they desired they would have defined and enforced a chapel service to their own liking without "humble submission and reverence". Accordingly, Elizabeth's chief duty was to prevent the granting of constitutional sanctions that would enable the Puritans to exercise legal ecclesiastical authority.

¹ *W.W.* III, 393.

Elizabeth did not always respect the absolute sovereignty of other monarchs over their subjects but she claimed it for herself and acted upon her claim. She pitted her own idea of autocratic sovereignty against that of the Presbyterians and used her power effectively by enforcing uniformity and keeping Parliament subject to her will. As an opportunist she relaxed her opposition to religious dissent in times of emergency, for instance, when the Roman Catholic danger was great. She was a prince of the type approved by Machiavelli and Bodin. As a sovereign who made her will the law, she was of the type of the Calvinistic God.

We are convinced that Elizabeth's fear that her sovereignty would be jeopardised by the legal establishment of Presbyterianism was justified. The civil magistrate's prerogatives would have been curtailed. The Church would have managed its own affairs. The Queen as a member of the Church would have been amenable to discipline and taken to task for her delinquencies. Bishops would have been abolished. The Book of Common Prayer would have been radically reformed. The Genevan parity of ministers and the Genevan service would have been introduced. Clericalism would have tended to rear its head; ministers as God's interpreters would have tried to dictate in social and political affairs as well as in religious. Intolerance would have been continued and a rigid uniformity enforced. The people on the one hand would have been subjected to ecclesiastical authority, and on the other trained to exercise the privileges of franchise, and thus room would have

been given for discontent as well as democratic self-assertion. Parliament would have been given greater privileges and powers than Elizabeth allowed it, and oligarchic and bureaucratic tendencies would have appeared. It would have depended upon the Queen's conduct whether she would have been dethroned or no. At any rate, for her own safety she would have had to walk warily, indulge in intrigue, foster a party at home and scheme for support abroad, and so live in a state of tension and uncertainty. The behaviour of the Separatists who carried Cartwright's two-kingdom theory so far as to separate Church and State altogether shows what might have happened on the left wing of the new Church, and the facts of the civil war and the rebellion in the seventeenth century show what might have taken place in the sixteenth, if the Puritans had then secured the power they wanted. All this forecast, however, would have to be discounted if the principle of toleration had been known and practised in the Elizabethan age, and if men had known then that a free State is compatible with a free Church, that the sovereignty of Christ can be fully exercised without interfering with the laws of economic and political science, and that a king may be truly a king although he is the head of a constitution whose sovereignty lies not only in himself, but also in an enfranchised people who govern themselves by a representative assembly. These new liberties and compatibilities were born of the collision between the claims to sovereignty of such rulers as Elizabeth and such Churchmen as Cartwright.

Chapter Four

OBEDIENCE

WE pass naturally from the question of sovereignty to that of obedience, for the acknowledged sovereign has a right to be obeyed.

Cartwright dissociates himself from the Romanists who refuse allegiance. "We be ready", he writes, "to give that subjection unto the prince and offer ourselves to the prince's correction in things wherein we shall do amiss."¹ Whitgift considers this protestation a mere pretence. He is convinced that if such a Church as Cartwright desired were established the Queen would be in danger of excommunication if she tried to restrain it, and that she would necessarily be subject to the popedom of M. Pastor. He charges the Puritans in their opposition to the Bishops with resistance to God in His ministers, to the Prince in her officers, to the laws of Church and State in their executors, and affirms that the protested obedience of the Puritans is so enwrapped with conditions and provisos that if it came to the trial it would prove as little as ever that of the Popish Bishops was in their greatest pride.² There is truth on both sides.

The Puritan's guiding principle is that the magistrate should be given full obedience "in the Lord".³ The absolute sovereignty of God alone commands

¹ *W.W.* II, 407.

² *Ibid.* II, 407-8.

³ *Ibid.* I, 21.

unconditional obedience. Subjects therefore ought not to render to their earthly sovereign an obedience that is in conflict with their duty to God.

“Our obedience unto him”, says Cartwright, “owght to be squared owt first by the love off God, then off men, our brethren especially: this new carpenter [Whitgift], as one that frameth his squire according to his tymber and not his timber according to the squire, will make our obedience to the cyvill magistrate the rule off the love off God and our brethren.”¹

If the magistrate does not satisfy the required condition, and issues a command that is repugnant to God’s law, Cartwright teaches that the Church “so refuseth that it disobeyeth not, in preferring obedience to the great God before that which is to be given to mortal man. It so resisteth that it submitteth the body and goods of those that profess it, to abide that which God will have them suffer in that case”.² The duty of non-resistance or passive obedience is regarded as divinely enjoined and so equivalent to full obedience to the will of God, Who may use even godless tyrants for the fulfilment of His purposes. Like Calvin and other reformers Cartwright considers that the non-resisting Christian has to resort to patient endurance until God in His Providence opens a way of deliverance, and he finds confirmation of this notion in New Testament precept and example.³ In answer to Whitgift’s charge of disobedience to the magistrate Cartwright writes: “Our open and simple profession off the necessitie off higher powers, and

¹ *Second Replie*, 404.

² *W.W.* I, 21.

³ *Second Replie*, I.

off the honour and humble submission to her Maiestie and all magistrates underneth her, ether in doing thinges commaunded, or patiently suffering for that which we can not with good conscience doo, shall be sufficient defense",¹ and states that the Puritans will submit themselves to punishment at the magistrate's hands rather than actively resist him, or violate their conscience.²

How is a man to know when he is justified in disobeying a monarch's command? Cartwright postulates that a lawful magistrate may command unlawful things.³ He cites the example of Saul and David. Like all earthly princes they were fallible and liable to issue injunctions at variance with divine laws. But this implies the passing of judgment upon kings by their subjects and the criticism of superiors by inferiors. By what means therefore is such criticism properly reached? Cartwright appeals to the voice of conscience as enlightened by the Word of God.

"We love [the magistrates] as our fathers and mothers", he writes, "we fear them as our lords and masters, and we obey them in the Lord, and for the Lord. If there be any thing wherein we do not according to that which is commanded, it is because we cannot be persuaded in our consciences that we may so do (whereof we are ready to render a reason out of the word of God); and if that will not serve, forthwith to submit ourselves to that punishment that shall be awarded against us."⁴

While the Puritan in his advocacy of liberty of conscience supports an important principle he may

¹ *Ibid.* 403.

² *W.W.* I, 79.

³ *Ibid.* II, 57.

⁴ *Ibid.* I, 79.

be opening the door to subjective individualism. Although he introduces as a safeguard the apparent objectivity of Scripture, that is discounted by the liability of Scripture to be variously interpreted by different minds. Whitgift, who is inclined to regard the magistrate's judgment as sacrosanct, fears that Cartwright has too high an estimate of human nature and that his notions would lead to an anarchic individualism. "Your imagination throughout your whole book" [*i.e.* the first *Reply*], he writes, "is of such a perfection in men as though they needed no laws or magistrates to govern them, but that every man might be as it were a law to himself; which whereunto it tendeth may easily be conjectured."¹

We are sure that if the Puritan doctrine of obedience had in it no other elements than those mentioned it would be too individualistic to give the State that allowed it scope, peace and unity. It would breed captious critics and troublesome cranks. But Cartwright provides for the restriction of the crop of irresponsible conscientious objectors by the disciplinary organisation of the Presbyterian Church. It stands for the principle of subordination; one of its chief aims is the inculcation of the spirit of obedience. It puts, he says, "the people in subjection under their governors, the governors in degree and order one under another, as the elder underneath the pastor, and the deacon underneath the elder"; it provides "that a particular church shall give place unto a provincial synod where many churches are, and the provincial to a national, and likewise that unto the general, if

¹ *W.W.* II, 62.

any be, and all unto Christ and his word".¹ Thus the Puritan scheme makes deliberate provision for the elimination of disobedience. Indeed, one of the main virtues and duties of the members of the Church is willingly to suffer themselves to be ruled by those whom God has set over them. As Travers says: "Horum autem omnium (ut in omni politia) unum fere illud officium est, ut ab ijs quos Deus praeferit, facile & libenter se regi gubernarique patiantur".² From the point of view of the State this inculcation of obedience may be looked upon as a boon if it is directed not only to the ecclesiastical but also to the civil governors. If the monarch and the Church leaders see eye to eye, as was the case with James VI and I and his Bishops, the former may regard himself as doubly blessed; but if they endorse different or contradictory policies, as was the case with Elizabeth and the Puritans, the former may regard himself as opposed by a disruptive and disloyal clericalism. Thus the Cartwrightian scheme makes the Church governors, as the interpreters of God's will, the depositaries of conscience, and gives them the power to determine when obedience is due and the right to enforce it. The danger of clericalism in practice is obvious, and is accentuated when the principle of obedience is applied not merely to the common people but even to the magistrates themselves as members of the Church. The higher powers must be obeyed. But sometimes the Scriptural injunction signified to the Puritans not only that citizens as such should obey the civil magistrate, but also that in the light of the

¹ *Ibid.* 1, 18.

² *Eccl. Disc.* 142. *Full and Plaine*, 185.

two-kingdom theory and the sovereignty of God all souls as such, even the monarch as a spiritual being, should obey the representatives of God to whom spiritual rule is committed.¹

The problem may be illustrated by the vestiarian controversy. The Puritans held that it was wrong to wear the prescribed Popish garments; not to wear them was to disobey the Queen; such disobedience entailed deprivation of office; but a minister was called to preach the Gospel and must not relinquish his function; therefore to disobey the Queen as conscience commanded meant to disobey Christ which conscience would not allow. Men like Cartwright resolved this dilemma by a reluctant loyalty to the earthly monarch in order that they might be in a position to be faithful to their highest duty, viz. to exercise the main offices of their ministry. "In this matter off apparell", says Cartwright, "it is confessed that obedience owght to be given where the commaundement is with iniury to the ministry."² The more radical Puritans refused to comply even with such commands as concerned vestments. All of them doubtless would have refused if they had been in power; they would simply have swept the "Aaronical"

¹ "Neque vero hic magistratus", says Travers, "etsi in reliqua Ecclesia politicae autoritatis ratione emineant, se ab hoc parendi & Ecclesiasticis magistratibus obediendi praecepto & mandato eximendos esse arbitrentur. Quum enim non minus de magistratus quam de aliorum salute illos sollicitos esse oporteat, & illius etiam animam (ut caeterorum) sua cura contineant, illis etiam non minus quam reliquis parendum est, & Ecclesiasticorum magistratum iustae auctoritati obtemperandum."—*Eccl. Disc.* 142. *Full and Plaine*, 185.

² *Second Replie*, 403.

garments out of the English Church altogether maugre all royal injunctions to the contrary. Given the status and recognition of a State Establishment, they would have commanded the monarch to obey them.

"Tarrying for the magistrate" was a form of obedience to constituted authority. The Puritans adopted it as their policy because they aimed at a State Presbyterian Church and were a minority without power to reach their goal. One way out of the apparent futility of tarrying was to change their aim and adopt the notions of the Separatists. When Whitgift asked Barrow whether "the Church of Christ, if the Prince deny or refuse to neglect abuses, may without staying for the Prince, reform them", Barrow replied "that it might and ought, though all the Princes in the world should prohibit the same upon pain of death".¹ Such an answer may be heroic, but so was Cartwright's when he said "certain of the things which we stand upon are such as that, if every hair of our head were a life, we ought to afford them for the defence of them".² The Separatist, however, could set about erecting his Church straightway. Two or three likeminded enthusiasts meeting together were enough to establish it. Cartwright, on the other hand, could not realise his ideal of a national Presbyterian Church unless he had the national government behind him: he could promulgate his principles and refuse to be coerced into renouncing them—and that is what he did—but he had to wait for the coöperation of the State authorities before his platform could be put into practice.

¹ *The Examinations of Henry Barrow, etc.* 15. ² *W.W.* I, 101.

The Puritan Presbyterians looked to the outposts of the English Church as points of attack and attrition where the duty of uniformity might not be so rigorously enforced and the need of tarrying for the magistrate might more readily be waived aside. In the Channel Islands they were able with the connivance of Elizabeth to set up and take part in a pure Presbyterian Church with but a nominal dependence upon the see of Winchester. The Queen's opportunism allowed her to slacken her belief in the need of absolute obedience on the part of subjects when it was deemed expedient to support rebels in Scotland, France or the Netherlands, and even when it was convenient to provide a cave of Adullam for her own ecclesiastical malcontents without prejudice to the general uniformity in the Church and to the peace of the realm. Accordingly she allowed Cartwright and his colleagues to serve with impunity in the Channel Islands Church.¹ At Antwerp, another outpost, matters were different. The Church there was more intimately connected with London. Its members were not islanders but English merchants. It was not a refuge for Huguenots but an institution associated with a busy centre of English trade. The plan to presbyterianise this Church did not receive the unanimous support of the merchants and there was the likelihood of dispeace. It is interesting to note that Walsingham was cognisant of the scheme and that he advised Davison, the chief "furtherer" of it, to tarry for the magistrate lest it miscarry. He advised caution; zeal was not enough to promote the

¹ *V. S.P.T.C.*

further reformation; policy with patience and prayer would advance the Presbyterian aims more successfully.¹ As Conyers Read points out in his *Sir Francis Walsingham*² Elizabeth's Secretary believed that the Queen's cooperation was necessary to the fulfilment of his Puritan designs, namely, the creation of a Pan-Protestant league with England as its champion and the reformation of the Church on Presbyterian lines, and feared that the cause might be spoiled if ardent individuals in the Puritan party alienated the Queen by their excessive demands and headlong action. Walsingham's advice was that the Puritans should seek the attainment of their goal by a slow and cautious approach rather than by flagrant disobedience. Knowing Elizabeth as he did his were the words of worldly wisdom.

The English Presbyterians were in a difficult position. They lived in a reign when the duty of obeying the civil magistrate was made most imperative and urgent by the machinations of the Romanists. The Tudor theory of absolute sovereignty was originally and essentially anti-Papal, and the Bull of 1570, the plots connected with Mary Queen of Scots, the missionary activity of the Jesuits, and the growing volume of anti-monarchical writings issued by such men as Allen and Doleman, increased the absoluteness of the demand for unquestioning obedience and made disobedience equivalent to treason. Further, the Elizabethan Puritans were not opposed by a Romanist Queen but by a declared enemy of Rome and were thus not called upon, as Knox and Goodman

¹ *S.P.T.C.* 175.

² II, 265.

had been, to proclaim the duty of resistance and rebellion. Indeed, they were recognised as a strong bulwark against Romanism and, in order that the unity of the realm might be preserved and that their anti-Romanist forces might be utilised, they were shown a measure of forbearance before the death of Mary and the defeat of the Armada—events that marked the removal of the acutest danger—which was immediately withdrawn when, after these events, Elizabeth breathed more freely and felt herself able to assert her full authority as the sovereign of a united and victorious nation. Then the Puritan movement was put down with a quick, heavy and decisive hand. Obedience was enforced. The chief consolation for the Puritans became the hope of a Presbyterian successor in James VI and with this hope in their hearts they bided their time.

In other circumstances the Puritan theory could develop differently. A strong organised Presbyterian Church persecuted by its sovereign may readily question the advisability of prolonged and indefinite waiting for reform, and pass from the attitude of unlimited non-resistance to that of active resistance, especially if it has military or parliamentary forces at its command. Bancroft had only to look to Scotland to see how the Presbyterians there had acted and ring out a warning. In France and Holland also circumstances, as Figgis points out,¹ were too strong for the theory of absolute obedience. The development of an influential visible Church claiming autonomy *jure divino* and regarding itself as the mouthpiece of God

¹ *Cambridge Modern History*, III, 752.

naturally tended to weaken the power of the State and to involve resistance to a persecuting prince.

Although Cartwright did not teach that a persecuting or godless monarch should be deposed or that subjects have the right to rebel, there were others holding his main Puritan doctrines who went beyond him in asserting the right of insurrection; and it is possible so to adjust his principles as to find in his limitation of earthly sovereignty by that of God a right on the part of those who consider themselves God's servants to make the civil magistrate fulfil the conditions that entitle him to obedience, perform the duties imposed upon him by divine law, faithfully exercise the trust committed to him as the representative of the people, or in default punish him. Cartwright himself did not consider Elizabeth a godless persecuting tyrant who should be deposed, but doubtless if Philip of Spain had been on the English throne his opinion of his sovereign would have been different. It was Roman Catholic writers such as Allen and Doleman who in support of their Church advocated the right of resistance on the ground of popular sovereignty or a compact theory and directed their arguments against the arch-enemy of their Church, Elizabeth.

In pre-Elizabethan days Calvinists like Knox and Goodman expressly taught the doctrine of insurrection; during her reign Calvinists like Beza, Hotman and Mornay taught it on the Continent. In Calvinistic Scotland it was both taught and practised, the chief exponent of the resistance philosophy being Buchanan. There were many points of contact between these

writers and the English Puritans, and it is interesting to discuss the question whether the teaching of the former was reflected in that of the latter and if not why not.

First of all we shall examine the position of Calvin himself who was in many respects the *fons et origo* of the Puritan movement. He expressly enjoins obedience to the civil magistrate as an agent of the sovereign God.¹ He supports his doctrine by Scriptural injunctions—I Pet. ii, 13, 17; Rom. xiii, 1, 2, 5; I Tim. ii, 1, 2; Tit. iii, 1. Obedience is due to tyrants as well as to worthy governors for they are divinely appointed too, and men have no right to act as bad subjects because their kings act as bad governors.² Appeal is made to Scripture, particularly to the Old Testament, to furnish precedents for dutiful subjection. But after affirming that vengeance belongs to the Lord and that the recourse of subjects ought to be to patience and prayer Calvin says that he is speaking of private men—*de privatis hominibus semper loquor*—and then makes the important and pregnant statement that inferior magistrates, such as

¹ Subditorum erga suos magistratus officium primum est, de eorum functione quam honorificentissime sentire, quam scilicet velut delegatam a Deo jurisdictionem agnoscunt....Ex eo et alterum deinde sequitur, ut propensis in eorum observationem animis suam illis obedientiam approbent.—*Institutio*, lib. iv, c. xx, §§ 22, 23.

² Hoc nobis si assidue ob animos et oculos obversetur, eodem decreto constitui etiam nequissimos reges, quo regum autoritas statuitur, nunquam in animum nobis seditiosae illae cogitationes venient, tractandum esse pro meritis regem, nec aequum esse ut subditos ei praestemus qui vicissim regem nobis non praestet.—*Ibid.* § 27.

the Ephors of Sparta, the Roman Tribunes, the Athenian Demarchs, or an assembly of the representatives of the three estates in a kingdom, have as guardians of popular liberty the right and duty to resist and repress tyrants.¹ He concludes his short

¹ Nam si qui nunc sint populares magistratus ad moderandam regum libidinem constituti (quales olim erant qui lacedaemoniis regibus oppositi erant ephori, aut romanis consulibus tribuni plebis, aut atheniensium senatui demarchi; et qua etiam forte potestate, ut nunc res habent, funguntur in singulis regnis tres ordines, quum primarios conventus peragunt), adeo illos ferocienti regum licentiae pro officio intercedere non veto, ut si regibus impotenter grassantibus et humili plebeculae insultantibus conneveant, eorum dissimulationem nefaria perfidia non carere affirmem: qui populi libertatem, cujus se Dei ordinatione tutores positos norunt, fraudulenter produunt.—*Institutio*, lib. iv, c. xx, § 31. Peter Heylyn wrote *The Stumbling Block of Disobedience and Rebellion* (1680) against this passage which, he pointed out, is not in line with Calvin's usual advocacy of passive obedience. While he notes "art and caution" in the "*si qui*", Heylyn shows the evil effect the words have had among Calvinists in Scotland, France, Holland, Sweden, etc. "This is the gap", he says, "through which rebellions and seditions have found so plausible a passage in the Christian world, to the dethroning of some Kings and Princes, the death of others." He criticises the opinion that the Ephors, etc. were purposely ordained to curb kings and shows that the supreme power exercised by Ephors and Tribunes was usurped by them. He acutely observes that Calvin's advocacy of obedience and conditional allowance of resistance were due to his being "distracted between his reason and his passion, his conscience and his private interest", and that this section was really an emanation from his subconscious self which sought to vindicate the constitution of Geneva and in particular the Syndics who were "Ephori and Tribunes mixt together". Heylyn, the uncompromising protagonist of absolute monarchy, also condemns the sovereignty of Parliament or the three Estates. He firmly believes that Calvin's words influenced the Puritans of England in the seventeenth century who proclaimed "the darling doctrine" that the king is but a creature of the people's making and so turned their sovereign into a mere "King of Clouts".

survey of the problem by reaffirming the principle which lies at the basis of his whole system, namely, that God is sovereign and that when an earthly king's commands are inconsistent with those of God we must at all costs obey the King of kings.¹

In our opinion it is apparent that Calvin does not tackle the question of the right of disobedience thoroughly and in detail. He does not write as a political student but primarily as a theologian and ecclesiastic. He deals very briefly with the problem under discussion and that at the very end of his *Institutes*. Instead, therefore, of saying, as a modern writer does,² that he definitely rejects a social compact theory and fails to recognise the rights of the people, we would say that Calvin does not disclose his whole mind on these points because he did not set out to deal with such matters but with the main tenets of the Christian religion. He certainly stands for passive obedience as a rule, but he does not work out the exception to his rule, namely, when the sovereignty of God is impugned, and he does not explicate the notion that Ephors and Estates General represent the people and act as protectors of popular rights. It was left to his disciples to mould, adapt and elaborate the Calvinistic principles according to the circumstances

¹ At vero in ea, quam praefectorum imperiis deberi constituimus, obedientia, id semper excipiendum est, imo in primis observandum, ne ab ejus obedientia nos deducat, cujus voluntati regum omnium vota subesse...iis deinde qui nobis praesunt hominibus subjecti sumus, sed non nisi in ipso. Adversum ipsum si quid imperent, nullo sit nec loco nec numero.—*Institutio*, lib. iv, c. xx, § 32.

² Matthews, in Hearnshaw, 213.

in which they were placed and to find consistent with them decided notions of the right of resistance.

In Scotland the Protestants avowed their allegiance to the civil magistrate and sought at first to secure the Reformation with the cognisance and consent of their rulers. "We wold", says Knox in his *History*, "attempt nothing without the knowledge of the sacrate authoritie."¹ The principle of obedience to rulers as ordained by God was generally accepted, although Knox distinguished between the authority ordained by God and the persons placed in authority,² and it was universally held by the Scottish reformers that obedience was to be given only to commands that were not repugnant to God's.³ When opposition was made by the Queen Regent to the reformers' demands the question of resistance to her at once arose. They appealed to conscience and the duty of supreme obedience to God. "Seing", they protest in 1558, "we can not obtene ane just Reformation, according to Goddis worde, that it be lauchfull to us to use oure selfis in materis of religioun and conscience, as we must ansuer unto God."⁴ In May, 1559, they wrote to the Regent that unless persecution were stayed "we wilbe compelled to tak the sward of just defence"; they promise their wonted obedience if they are granted liberty of conscience and the exercise of the religion which they deem the only true religion "without whiche we fermelie purpose never to be subject to mortall man", and they subscribe their letter "Your Grace's obedient subjects in all

¹ Knox, *Works*, I, 301.

² *Ibid.* I, 332.

³ *Ibid.* I, 411.

⁴ *Ibid.* I, 313.

thing is not repugnant to God".¹ More and more it was asserted that they were aiming not only at a religious reformation but also at the liberation of their country from the dominion of strangers. The twin motive—anti-Romanist and anti-French—was regarded as a justification for their resistance. When the deposition of the Queen Regent came to be considered the main conceptions that carried the day with the Protestants were that she was not fulfilling her duty, that her conduct was repugnant to God, that the nobles and barons as the representatives of the realm had a right to assume authority, and that their action was not prejudicial to the sovereignty of their Queen, then in France.² But when Queen Mary came home Knox told her that subjects have a right to resist even princes, if the latter exceed their bounds, even as children have a right and a duty to repress a frenzied father.³ In 1563 Mary again discussed the question of obedience with Knox, who said: "Thei [subjects] ar bound to obey you and that not but in God. Ye ar bound to keape lawis unto them. Ye crave of thame service: thei crave of you protectioun and defence against wicked doaris".⁴ Here there is a suggestion of a compact theory which involves the duty of obedience on the part of subjects if the rulers fulfil their duty of good government, but not the origination of kingship in the selection of the people, for Knox says explicitly

that it is neither birth, influence of starres, election of people, force of armes, nor finally what soever can be comprehended

¹ Knox, *Works*, I, 326.

² *Ibid.* I, 442-5.

³ *Ibid.* II, 282.

⁴ *Ibid.* II, 372-3.

under the power of nature, that maketh the distinction betwixt the superior power and the inferior, or that doth establish the royall throne of kings; but it is the only and perfect ordinance of God.¹

When Lethington argues that Bucer, Musculus and Calvin advocate passive obedience in times of persecution, Knox makes the interesting reply that they speak "of Christiane subjectis unto tyrantis and infidelis, so dispersed that thai haif no uther force but onlie to sobbe to God for delyverance".² Thus the Knoxian notion is that the power to resist gives Christian people a right to resist. Here is a decided and a dangerous development of Calvinism. Of course, Knox does not believe in the right of individuals as such actively to resist their kings; he allows the right to a nation acting through its accredited representatives. "I speik", he says, "of the people assembled togidder in one bodie of ane Commounewelth, unto whome God has gevin sufficient force, nocht onlie to resyst, but als to suppres all kynde of opin idolatrie."³ He looks to the Old Testament for precedents and finds them there, *e.g.* in the submissive conduct of the Israelites in Egypt as compared with their aggressive conduct in Canaan. He is really expressing a conception that justifies the happenings of the Scottish Reformation. Circumstances colour his political thought.

It has not been particularly noted that Knox went so far as to advocate and justify tyrannicide. This he did in his anti-French, anti-Spanish, anti-Romanist

¹ *Ibid.* VI, 236.

² *Ibid.* II, 442.

³ *Ibid.* II, 442-3.

First Blast, when he wrote that it was the duty of the nobility and the popular Estates to remove tyrants,¹ when in his *Appellation* to the nobles and Estates of Scotland (1558) he said: "Yee oght to remove from honours and to punish with death such as God hath condemned by his owne mouth", and affirmed that the people of God should put idolaters to death "if by anie meanes God geve them the power".² He explicitly wrote that the nobility, judges and people of England should have punished "that Jesabel", Mary Tudor, with death.³ He argued that idolatry by divine law deserves death, that Roman Catholicism is sheer idolatry, that nobles and Estates have a right to depose a persecuting tyrant, and that accordingly Protestant "Ephors" ought to put an oppressive Roman Catholic sovereign to death. Of course he had in mind such sovereigns as Mary of Guise and Mary Tudor against whom his *First Blast* was chiefly directed.

It is tempting to examine further the political views of reformers like Knox⁴ and in particular the development of the compact theory that accompanied the doctrine of insurrection. But we shall only allude to the Italian influence suggested by John Craig who affirmed that "the band betwix the Prince and the Peopill is reciproce", a doctrine which he had met with among the Black Friars in Bologna in 1554,⁵ and pass on to a consideration of Buchanan's *De Jure Regni Apud Scotos*.

Buchanan's views of a restricted monarchy were

¹ Knox, *Works*, IV, 416. ² *Ibid.* IV, 498, 507. ³ *Ibid.* IV, 507.

⁴ V. Gooch, 37-9.

⁵ Knox, *Works*, II, 457-8.

held by him long before he published his *De Jure* in 1579. They occur in his *Baptistes*, which was penned in 1541.¹ His humanistic studies must be taken into account when we consider the source of his opinions. Both he and Knox may also have been influenced in their political liberalism by John Major. Through Major they would come into touch with the notions of popular sovereignty and tyrannicide. As Hume Brown shows,² the doctrine of resistance as expounded by the Scottish reformers was not a Calvinistic import but was known in Scotland before the Reformation and was a legacy of the mediaeval schoolmen. Buchanan's *De Jure* was also a party document, prompted by the conduct of the Scottish reformers and designed as an *apologia* for their opposition to their sovereign and particularly for their deposition of Queen Mary in 1567. It was a *livre de circonstance* meant to vindicate the Scots in the eyes of the world, as is apparent in its concluding words: Pro aequitate causae satis multa mihi dixisse videor: quae si exterorum quibusdam minus placeant, considerent rogo quam inique nobiscum agant.

Buchanan holds that society is built upon a divine or natural human propensity: Ea est quaedam naturae vis, non hominibus modo, sed mansuetioribus etiam aliorum animantium indita.³ The natural law is also divine and societies therefore derive from God and do not spring merely from self-interest or utility.⁴ Kings were made not for themselves but for the sake of the people: reges non sibi sed populo creatos esse.⁵

¹ Hume Brown, *George Buchanan*, 123.

² *Ibid.* 282.

³ *De Jure Regni*, 9.

⁴ *Ibid.* 11.

⁵ *Ibid.* 13.

Monarchy is not the only necessary form of government: neque multum referre puto rex, dux, imperator an consul vocetur, qui praesit, modo illud teneatur, eum aequitatis tuendae causa in magistratu esse collocatum.¹ In order that kings may fulfil their function properly they must rule according to divine law; as has been said, *rex* should be *lex loquens* and *lex, rex mutus*. Popular sovereignty is asserted; it is from the people that the king derives his right to rule; it is the people through their representatives—*ex omnibus ordinibus selecti*—who keep the king faithful to the law. Buchanan refers approvingly to the Ephors. He shows how the rulers of Scotland have not been permitted unrestricted rule; they have been held in check by inferior officials or a corporate council whose function was to keep the ruler true to his oath and make him maintain the ancient customs and laws. He distinguishes the magistrate from the magistracy and contends that Paul enjoins obedience to the latter. Seeing the king ought to serve the highest interests of the people he is accountable to them. He insists that there exists a mutual compact between prince and people—*mutua igitur regi cum civibus est pactio*.² A tyrant who does not observe the duties of a ruler and breaks his compact is an enemy of the people; he creates a state of war in which not only the body of the people but also individuals are justified in killing the enemy—*bello autem cum hoste iusta de causa semel suscepto ius est non modo universo populo, sed singulis etiam hostem interimere*.³ Tyranny is such a crime that

¹ *De Jure Regni*, 20.

² *Ibid.* 96.

³ *Ibid.* 97.

the Church is surely bound to regard it as punishable with death—igitur Ecclesia (quae multo leviora crimina morte punienda censet) quem vivum e coetu bonorum expellet, mortuum in coetum cacodaemonum relegat, non eum morte dignum existimabit?¹ It is true that this last opinion is put in the form of a question and probably has led Dr R. H. Murray to say that Buchanan did not commit himself on the problem of tyrannicide,² but to us it is perfectly clear that Buchanan has already in the words previously quoted and in the whole tenor of his discussion of tyrants made it plain that he means his question regarding the Church's attitude to tyrannicide to be answered in the affirmative.

Although Buchanan's *De Jure* is not a profound and exhaustive analysis of political theory or a well documented thesis from the point of view of the historical student, it is a piquant and powerful little book which did much to strengthen the forces directed against absolute monarchy. The fact that it is a purely or primarily political work and not a theological treatise (like Calvin's *Institutes*) or an ecclesiastical exposition (like Cartwright's writings) and that it actually reflected the spirit and practice of the Scottish Puritans is of the greatest significance. It revealed the political principles and intentions associated with what was ostensibly a religious movement.

The doctrine of insurrection was not championed by many Protestant Englishmen during the period

¹ *Ibid.* 101.

² Murray, *Political Consequences of the Reformation*, 272.

under review. We have Ponet's *Short Treatise of Political Power* (1556), which advocates a system of Ephors and justifies tyrannicide, and Christopher Goodman's *How Superior Powers Oght to be obeyd* (1558), which supports active resistance to monarchs who disobey God, attributes to the common people as well as the inferior magistrates the right to see that the prince is subject to God's laws, makes the true Church the arbiter of the prince's fidelity to his duty, and in particular advocates resistance to Mary Tudor and defends Wyatt's rebellion. We should note that both works were written during the persecution of Protestants by a Roman Catholic Queen and before the advent of Elizabeth. They too were *livres de circonstance*.

Before returning to the English Puritan movement we shall cross the Channel again and see how French Calvinistic thought was affected by the massacre of St Bartholomew's Day, 1572. Beza in his *Du Droit des Magistrats sur leur Sujets* (1574) lays stress upon the provisional character of men's duty of obedience to kings—royal commands must not be repugnant to those of the sovereign God. He analyses this condition as implying that kings' commands must not be irreligious or iniquitous, *i.e.* contrary to the first or second tables of the decalogue respectively. He regards kings as created for the people and not *vice versa*, and introducing the contractual element he posits a bond of mutual obligation between the two. Resistance is allowed to the people through their representatives, whose duty it is to see that the divine law, which includes the sovereignty of the people,

is observed, and accordingly to repress and if necessary to slay tyrants. Like all the Huguenot monarchomachs Beza favours the federalistic conception of the supreme executive power of the Estates General.

Hotman's *Franco-Gallia* (1574) is a constitutional history of France. Representing the reaction against the Machiavellianism and monarchical absolutism that manifested themselves in the Bartholomew massacre, it furnished the Huguenots with a legal and historical justification for their opposition to their persecutors. In the Preface, addressed to Frederick III, Elector of the Palatinate, it is stated that the civil dissensions in France are due to the neglect of the fundamental principles of the country's constitution. These are examined from an historical point of view. Hotman is led to the conclusion that the people enjoyed their liberty for over eleven hundred years and that among the rights which they have now lost is that of being governed by a limited and elective monarchy. The author appeals to precedent to prove that kings were elected by the people, that popular sovereignty was expressed through representative assemblies, and that the rulers have been accountable to the national council and when need arose have been checked, resisted or deposed. He lays down the principle that as a pupil is not appointed for the sake of his tutor, nor a ship for a pilot, nor an army for a general, so the people are not instituted for the king but *vice versa*—*salus populi suprema lex*. While appealing to Plato, Aristotle and Cicero for support of the mixed state, he looks to the Germans as those

who introduced it into Gaul. The controlling power over tyrants exercised by the French Estates he regards as similar to that used by the Spartan Ephors or the English Parliament. He writes as a humanist, and as a French patriot anxious to restore his country's right to assert its sovereignty through a representative government, but he also writes as a Huguenot on behalf of his coreligionists persecuted by Roman Catholic rulers who have assumed an absolute sway over the lives and opinions of their subjects.

Mornay's *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos* (1579) repeats many of the ideas already familiar to us—the absolute sovereignty of God, the elective nature of monarchy, the right of the people through their “Ephors” to resist tyranny, etc.—but the author lays special stress upon the compact theory that justifies disobedience. He bases society upon two contracts, the first between God on the one hand, the king and the people on the other, the second between the king and the people; it is the breach of these pacts by the king that justifies the people—but not individuals—in their disobedience and insurrection. He also strikes a significant note in asserting the right and duty of princes to come to the aid of subjects of another country who are persecuted for religion, in approving the conduct of Elizabeth in this respect, and in advocating an international Protestant league such as was dear to the heart of other leading Protestants, for instance, Walsingham himself. Behind Mornay's general principles we can trace the particular circumstances of the Huguenots and the problems raised by

the persecution to which they were subjected. It is an answer to the massacre of 1572.

Now we return to the English Puritans. Their opponents suspected that they were imbued with the principles of resistance taught by Knox, Buchanan, Goodman, Beza, Hotman and Mornay. "English Scottizing" is a dominant theme in Bancroft's *Dangerous Positions*, where the Scottish Reformation is explained as an insurrectionary movement in which Knox "did shew himselfe to be a most especiall instrument",¹ and in which Buchanan's anti-monarchical notions—freely quoted by Bancroft throughout his book—were acted upon by the Scottish reformers. One of the particular enquiries set on foot by Bancroft, ca. 1589–90, regarding the Scottish Church was designed to discover whether its members approved of Buchanan's *De Jure*.² "Doe not we knowe", says Bancroft to Cartwright in 1591, "from whom you draw your discipline and Church government, doe not we know their judgments and their practise? which is to bring in the further reformation against the Princes will by force and armes",³ and then he refers to Goodman's book as well as to the proceedings of Scots and Huguenots. In his famous court sermon (Feb. 1588–9) he asks his hearers to

reade the writings of the chieffest pillars of these platformes, as the booke *De jure magistratuum in subditos*: the booke intituled *Vindiciae contra tyrannos* and another *De jure regni apud Scotos*: The dialogs of Eusebius Philadelphus, with sundry other of that sort, and you shall finde in them these

¹ *D.P.* 10.

² *S.P.T.C.* 342.

³ *Ibid.* 462.

most strange and rebellious propositions stiffly maintained, dilated, and amplified.

“If any do here object”, he proceeds, “that I stand too long upon this matter, considering that these things do touch mens dealings and writings in other countries, and cannot in any sort be applied to our reformers in England: my answer is that I wish from the bottome of my hart it were so, but I greatly feare, by that which already is done, that except there be in time very good order taken, it will fall out far otherwise.”

To discover whether these suspicions and fears were justified we shall try to answer the question, Did the English Puritans have any close associations with the Protestant exponents of the right of resistance? Knox of course died just as the Cartwrightian movement was beginning, but his successor, Andrew Melville, was a colleague of Cartwright's at Geneva (1571-2) and along with other Scottish ministers fraternised with the Puritans in England at a later date (1584-5). Scottish Churchmen invited Cartwright and Travers to Chairs in St Andrews, gave an honourable welcome to Udall and Waldegrave when they came to Scotland, and took a sympathetic interest in the trials of English Puritanism from 1566 onwards.¹ Goodman came from Scotland to England and joined the Puritans.² Beza was for a time closely associated with Cartwright in Geneva.³ As to Hotman and Mornay, we do not know whether Cartwright and Travers when on the Continent knew them personally, but it is probable that they met. In any case it is a singular fact that the *Explicatio* of Travers (1574) was issued by the same secret press that issued some of the books that

¹ *V. S.P.T.C.*

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

represented the violent Huguenot reaction against the Bartholomew massacre, *e.g.* the very dialogues of Eusebius Philadelphus mentioned by Bancroft.¹ We should also take into account the association of Cartwright, Travers and others of their party with the Calvinists of the Netherlands, who renounced their allegiance to a tyrant on the ground that he had not fulfilled the contract implied in his sovereignty and were led by that typical sixteenth century Protestant Ephor, William of Orange. These brief references suffice to prove that there were actual points of contact between the English Puritans and the teachers and practisers of active resistance to absolute monarchy.

Besides, it is demonstrable that the Puritans were acquainted with the main conceptions current in the writings of the advocates of resistance. The conception of a compact between prince and people was known to the Puritans, but they did not utilise it to justify rebellion against Elizabeth. We meet with the notion in Travers (1574). "Ut enim in Republicis", he writes, "non tantum in populi sed optimatum vel etiam unius imperio atque principatu constituendo, antequam constituatur omne imperium penes populum est, qui sponte sua sibi magistratus delegit, quorum autoritate postea gubernetur."² Walsingham adduces the theory in an interview with James VI (Sept. 1583) to impress upon the king the evils of absolutism and the need of dutiful and just government if the obedience of subjects is to be secured.³ But while acquainted with contractual notions such

¹ *Ibid.* 138.

² *Eccl. Disc.* 41.

³ Conyers Read, *Sir F. Walsingham*, II, 218.

as were directed against tyranny by their coreligionists the Puritans on the whole confined their application of them to the Church, *e.g.* Cartwright repeatedly advocates the necessity of popular consent to ecclesiastical proceedings as against the monarchical absolutism of the Bishops, but deliberately refrains from the advocacy of the principle in relation to the affairs of the State. We have seen that the right of resistance was attached to representative assemblies and ephor-like officials by the Calvinistic supporters of insurrection, and we have met with the same ideas among the English Puritans, with this difference, that they are employed to complete an ecclesiastical organisation and not to prepare a revolt from Elizabeth. Travers, for instance, says that the assemblies that exercised the highest power in civil societies past and present are analogous to the supreme administrative and executive body in the Church,¹ but he does not proceed to urge that Elizabeth's authority should be subordinated to or resisted by a national representative council. When in the Star Chamber, Cartwright denied that he taught that there ought to be Ephors or such like officers in the State with power to depose the sovereign,² and he pointed out that Fenner in his *Sacra Theologia* did not teach that the monarch should be controlled or repressed "but only where the lawes

¹ Habet ergo ut Lacædemon γερουσίαν, Athenæ Areopagum, Roma senatum, omne denique regnum atque omnis Respublica consilium, cuius maxima sit in omnib. reb. gerendis autoritas, & a qua reliqua societas gubernetur: ita & Ecclesia suum πρεσβυτέριον, cuius autoritate res omnes Ecclesiasticæ administrantur.—*Eccl. Disc.* 125. Cf. 121.

² *S.P.T.C.* 333.

of the lande doo establish such an authoritie as the Ephori in Lacedaemonia had".¹

If the English Puritans and the Calvinistic monarchomachs belonged substantially to the same political school why is there such an apparent gulf between them? The reason is that the two parties lived in different circumstances. Elizabeth was not a Roman Catholic like Mary, Queen of Scots, and did not persecute Protestants like Philip II or Catherine de' Medici. She was neither an idolatrous Papist nor a cruel tyrant. In August, 1559, Argyll and James Murray wrote to Cecil: "We have against us the established authoritie";² the Puritans could not say that with the same absoluteness, for though Elizabeth differed from them she at times connived at their practices and for long many of their chief patrons were among her chief counsellors. Indeed, Elizabeth acted as a Protestant Ephor in her opposition to Romanist princes. She helped Scottish, Dutch and French rebels in their struggles for liberty and for her aid was held in high esteem by the very parties to whom the monarchomachs belonged. Even Mornay praised her. As Conyers Read demonstrates in his book on Sir Francis Walsingham, Elizabeth was persuaded by policy and circumstance to become the champion of her Secretary's ideal—a free Protestant confederation. Her anti-Spanish, anti-Guisian, anti-Jesuit activities were bound to be regarded with favour by the Puritans. She was not responsible for a Bartholomew massacre; to her credit stood the defeat of the Armada; and throughout her reign and

¹ *Ibid.* 334-5.

² Knox, *Works*, vi, 66.

particularly after the Bull of 1570 she maintained a stout opposition to Rome. In these respects she was the very Queen to win the allegiance and not the enmity of the Puritans. She was not bad enough to make them preach the right of resistance and tyrannicide like their brethren across the border and across the Channel.

Withal, Elizabeth utilised rather than sympathised with the Puritans. She removed their venom by making them her catspaw. But she was astute enough to prevent them from gaining more power than she considered safe. It was not a danger to allow isolated Puritan ministers to enjoy liberty in places like Warwick Hospital or in Channel Island Chaplaincies; it would have been more dangerous and impolitic to imprison them for life. But it was a grave danger to allow Parliament to support Puritanism; so she acted as an autocratic Tudor and muzzled the House of Commons. When the Spanish and Roman menace was minimised by the defeat of the Armada, Elizabeth was in a position to face the Puritan movement—now growing too strong and outspoken because of her leniency—and crush it. It was ruthlessly nipped in the bud. At the critical time—1588-9—it lost some of its weightiest supporters. The murmurs of resistance that began to be heard in its heyday were stifled. It had not the power which, in the opinion of Calvinistic supporters of resistance, would have conferred a God-given right to assert itself against a Queen who had the nation behind her. Cartwright and others were clapped into prison, and the party could only beg to be tolerated and hope for a better

day when they would be able by means of a larger following and, better still, by a more powerful Parliamentary backing, to make more effective their resistance to a monarch who opposed them. Meanwhile the remanent party would most wisely wait with patience for the advent of the Presbyterian king from Scotland. The death of Mary Queen of Scots had settled the Puritan fears regarding the succession and so influenced them to be politically quiescent. Elizabeth had bluffed them and then crushed them into a party of non-resistance.

Although the Puritans did not issue books like Buchanan's or Mornay's they did more than merely preach the doctrine of tarrying for the magistrate. Their magistrate was a laggard and a fickle mistress, and the way to win her support or disarm her opposition was to persuade her that the essential aims of Puritanism were consonant with those that served the interests of the crown and the weal of the realm, or to secure a pro-Puritan constitutional party strong enough to override royal contradiction and put the Presbyterian platform upon a statutory basis. The former aim has been dealt with at length by Conyers Read in his monumental work on Walsingham, which shows that in spite of Burghley's opposition the Puritan court party succeeded, at least in foreign affairs, in imposing its policy upon a reluctant Queen. At home the effort to cope with royal opposition and to realise the Puritan ideals was through Parliament. As early as 1572 an Admonition had been addressed to Parliament by the nascent Puritan party: later on—and particularly in the 'eighties—when the Conference

movement was being consolidated the Puritans concentrated their forces on the winning of the Parliamentary citadel to their side.¹ Fasts, prayers, consultations, petitions, bills, drafts of discipline were organised with this end in view: men like Job Throkmorton anxiously strove to secure a seat in the House of Commons in order to further the Puritan cause there.² Doubtless the ministers and the laymen had secret meetings together to prepare their case immediately before and during the sessions 1584-5 and 1586-7, and thus the Puritan movement had the effect of producing a political party organisation.³ But the Parliamentary voice of Puritanism was effectually silenced by Elizabeth. Men like Peter Wentworth saw that the only way in which to secure constitutional support for Puritanism was to fight for Parliamentary privileges, especially the freedom of speech. The campaign for the establishment of a Presbyterian Church was useless if its supporters in Parliament were not allowed to express themselves and carry their votes to an issue. We believe that Wentworth was right and that Elizabeth knew that he was right. It was only through Parliamentary recognition that the Puritans would be able to secure the power which would make active resistance to the Queen needless by making Presbyterianism part of the law of the land. The struggle to secure this Parliamentary support failed because Elizabeth would not grant the freedom of speech which men like Wentworth fought for. The centre of gravity in the

¹ *V. S.P.T.C.* 242 ff.

² *Ibid.* 303.

³ *V. J. E. Neale, Eng. Hist. Review*, xxxix (1924), 204.

political arena therefore became the question of the relation of monarchical to parliamentary sovereignty, a question that was not to be solved in Elizabeth's day, but one the solution of which was made urgent and prepared for by the effort of the Puritans to secure parliamentary endorsement of their Presbyterian scheme.

Thus in theory the Elizabethan Puritans followed Calvin rather than his disciples because they were placed in different circumstances from the Scots, the Huguenots and the Dutch. Cartwright's writings therefore emphasise, as Calvin's *Institutes* did, the duty of passive obedience rather than the active resistance advocated by Beza, Mornay, Knox and Buchanan. But it should be noted that the writings in which Cartwright's political opinions were expressed were written in the 'seventies. In the following decade the Puritan danger lay not so much in its theory as in its practice, and that, although constitutional and consistent with loyalty to Elizabeth, was nevertheless an attempt to overcome her by laws of Parliament that would act as Ephors to restrain and coerce her, by resistance under the guise of obedience, by a search for legitimate power that would in spite of Elizabeth achieve the Puritan aims.

Chapter Five

MISCELLANEOUS

WE shall now deal with certain ancillary notions of the Puritans which have political significance.

(i) PARITY

In sustaining his principle of ministerial equality or Presbyterian parity Cartwright naturally attacks the monarchical conception that underlies Episcopacy. He has to meet Whitgift's argument that the form of Church government should be analogous to the monarchical civil government.

"He [Whitgift] must remember", says Cartwright, "that it is not necessary in a commonwealth that there should be one over all ('Note this suspicious speech of the kind of government', adds Whitgift in the margin); for that there are other good commonwealths, wherein many have like power and authority. And further, if, because there is one king in a land above all, he will conclude there should be one archbishop over all, I say, as I have said, that it is not against any word of God which I know (although it be inconvenient) but that there may be one Caesar over all the world; and yet I think M. Doctor will not say that there may be one archbishop over all the world."¹

In answer to the objection that the Puritans seek equality in order to evade the control of the prince, the bishops and other ministers, Cartwright says that

¹ *W.W.* II, 263.

they desire authority grounded on the word of God "which if any minister shall abuse to his gain or ambition, then he ought to abide not only the controlment of the other ministers, yea, of the brethren, but also further the punishment of the magistrates".¹ In lieu of the provision for order and subordination so manifestly contained in a monarchical system the Puritan programme has its courts and over each court a moderator, *primus inter pares*, with power to prevent confusion and to counteract the deficiencies of an undiluted equality. Nevertheless we can understand how an upholder of the *status quo* in Elizabeth's time could see in the advocacy of Presbyterian parity an attack on the principle of monarchy and a danger to the State, especially if the Church's system of government ought to be, as Whitgift held, of the same kind as the civil. In any case, whether to the advantage or disadvantage of the State, it is likely and natural for subjects to hold concerning civil affairs the same non-monarchical principles which they, as Church members, apply to ecclesiastical.

(ii) MANY ARE BETTER THAN ONE

The same danger to the monarchical principle is contained in the Puritan belief that a corporate is more efficient than an individual supervision.² Cartwright prefers government by an eldership because a pastor cannot have eyes in every corner of the parish and argues against the trial of ministers by a bishop on the ground that examination by a company

¹ *Ibid.* II, 407.

² "It is harder to draw many into an error than one."—*Ibid.* II, 238. Cf. *Ibid.* I, 475-6.

of Presbyters is bound to be more efficient.¹ In reply to the objection that his conception would be dangerous if given a political application he affirms that it does not necessarily follow that because civil affairs are committed to one that the spiritual should be, and that man's insight in temporal matters is sharper than in ecclesiastical, and that his notion is so far acceptable to princes that they consult with counsellors in weighty matters of the realm and appoint whole benches of justices for the decision of law cases and "doo sufficiently declare therby howe they have the judgement off one (be he never so wise) greatly in suspition off error".² Cartwright is careful to note that we must not compare one good ruler with a lawless company, as it were "a little conduite water closed up in lead with much fennish and muddy".³ Thus argue his opponents, but their reasoning would prove that it is better to have one eye than two, because some see better with one than others with two. He compares a monarchical tyrant in the Church with one in the State and holds that the former would ruin the Church, while a commonwealth can be preserved in spite of tyranny, and concludes that for this reason alone it is better to have a monarchy in the State than in the Church. Anxious to show that his arguments against an archbishop are not directed against the civil magistrate he says: "There is as far distance betwene them as betwene heaven and earth".⁴ "Moreover", he writes, "the cawse why the monarchie in the commen wealth can not be

¹ *W.W.* III, 165. *Second Replie*, 130.

² *Second Replie*, 130.

³ *Ibid.* 578.

⁴ *Ibid.* 580.

condemned is for that it is one off those govermentes which God hath established and allowed by his word.”¹ One of those governments! Therefore, it is conceivable that those citizens who believe in the rule of the many in Church may believe in its universal applicability and so, as Whitgift and Bancroft and Elizabeth feared, seek the downthrow or limitation of an absolute civil monarchy.

(iii) LOCALISM

The Puritans emphasised the parish as the ecclesiastical unit. Each minister must be attached to a cure; he must reside in his parish where he and his elders in the Consistory exercise supreme rule. The municipal nature of the Church is illustrated by Cartwright's reference to the mode of election of the officials of boroughs and cities as a guide to and vindication of that which should hold good in the Church.² So important is the local Consistory that it is generally known, both among the early Puritans and their opponents, as the Presbytery;³ is made synonymous with the Church indicated in the command *Dic Ecclesiae*;⁴ and is explicitly stated to have the chief care and charge of the ecclesiastical commonwealth.⁵ At the beginning of their movement such emphasis is laid by the Puritans on the local Church and its council that we are not surprised that contemporaries like Whitgift were of opinion that they wished to create a multitude of self-sufficient ecclesiastical

¹ *Ibid.* 579.

² *W.W.* I, 304 n.

³ *S.P.T.C.* 77 ff.

⁴ *W.W.* III, 168. *Full and Plaine*, 160.

⁵ *Full and Plaine*, 191. *Eccl. Disc.* 145.

commonwealths, each parish being a kingdom and each pastor a king or a pope, both being outwith the jurisdiction of the civil magistrate as well as the diocesan bishop,¹ or that modern scholars like Hunt and Odgers have failed to trace the mention of courts beyond the parochial in such a work as Travers's *Ecclesiasticae Disciplinae*.² But as we have pointed out elsewhere³ these courts are mentioned by Travers, and Cartwright does not fail to allude to them and point out that the separate parochial societies are bound by a synodical organisation to one another and to the whole Church of the realm.⁴ Nevertheless, the federalism that is evident in a national Presbyterian Church is not pronounced in the initial stages of English Puritanism; it does not receive prominent attention till the 'eighties—after it has become established in Scotland—when the classical or Conference movement is developed and consolidated; at first the Puritans lay chief emphasis upon their Consistories and parochial commonwealths. This emphasis was due not only to the necessity of having a local point of departure for the launching of a national scheme, but also to the fact that the Puritans were definitely under the influence of a city-state idea. Not only did they as Calvinists look to Geneva as their model; as humanists, they also found inspiration in the constitutions of Athens, Sparta and Rome.⁵

The objection that the idea of municipality, generally regarded as a product of Geneva which has been

¹ *W.W.* III, 9, 165, 184.

³ *Ibid.* 143.

⁵ *V. supra*, 44, 92 n. 1. *V. infra*, 135.

² *S.P.T.C.* 143-4.

⁴ *Second Replie*, 231.

transplanted into Presbyterianism, makes the latter unsuitable as the polity of a national Church, is not a new one. It was in the mind of Whitgift when he wrote against the *Admonition*: "You must not look to have the same government of one whole kingdom and of one little village or city. In such matters you must have consideration to the time, place, persons, and other such circumstances: the lack of this discretion maketh you wander you know not whither".¹ Cartwright's reply is very significant.² He refers to the French Reformed Church to show how Presbyterianism can be applied to a realm, and to the Apostolic Churches established throughout the world to prove that "the large spreading of the Church cannot hinder it". The allusion to France is of the greatest interest. The French Book of Discipline served as a model for Presbyterians in Scotland, England and in the Channel Islands. This was noted long ago by Matthew Sutcliffe.³ Nowadays the influence of the Huguenot Church upon the politics of other Calvinistic bodies is receiving new attention.⁴ In particular it should be regarded as an intermediary between Geneva and the Scottish and English Presbyterian schemes. It exemplified the adaptation of the polity of a city-state to a national framework. Cartwright was of opinion that though England had begun the Reformation earlier than France and Scotland, the latter countries had gone further and that England

¹ *W.W.* III, 280.

² *Ibid.* III, 183.

³ *S.P.T.C.* 363.

⁴ *V.* Janet Macgregor, *The Scottish Presbyterian Polity* (1926). Mrs W. W. D. Campbell, *Discipline or Book of Order of the Reformed Churches of France*. *S.P.T.C.* 159, 363, 379.

should follow their advance: "As we have been unto them an example and have provoked them to follow us, so the Lord will have us also profit and be provoked by their example".¹ He regarded the French Presbyterian Church as a refutation in fact of the charge that Presbyterianism would produce a mere congeries of isolated and unrelated city-states and was unsuitable for plantation in a national area.

Cartwright also employs a most illuminating idea to prove that the localism in his platform was consistent with monarchical government in the State and did not endanger the unity, peace and law of the realm. He likens the relation between the local self-governing Churches and the omniscient State to that of microcosmic organisms to a larger comprehensive organism. He utilises for analogy the relation between a household and the State: "If the master of the household may, or owght to retein his authority without preiudice of the magistrate: why may it not be so in the government of the Church"?² The principle which the Puritan defends has in the modern State the widest vogue. Indeed, local self-government must increase *pari passu* with the growth of the absolutist claims of the larger unity if the State is to be really efficient and sovereign.³

The idea of the city-state that was bound up with early Puritanism expressed itself in and was confirmed by the fact that the majority of its most stalwart adherents were to be found in towns. In another place we have taken note of the sympathetic interest

¹ *W.W.* III, 316.

² *The Rest*, 59.

³ *V. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*, 279.

in Puritanism displayed by London aldermen and merchants, by members of civic corporations in Warwick, Leicester, etc.¹ So it was in France: the Huguenots were mostly townsmen and their religion expressed itself in the active industrial life for which they made themselves famous. In Holland and Scotland it was the same: the burghers and administrators of civic communities were outstanding champions of Presbyterianism. The intense and vital type of character developed by the application of the idea of local self-government to ecclesiastical or temporal affairs is a power to be reckoned with by the State, a most valuable political asset or a most potent intestine foe. All depends upon the relation between the central authority and the local units.

(iv) PUNISHMENT

As men who made the Consistory, their most prominent court, the seat of their local government, the Puritans were called by their critics Consistorians; as men who emphasised the disciplinary functions of the Church they were dubbed Disciplinarians. Considering them as the latter we shall now examine some of the political notions that crop up in connection with the coercive aspect of the Discipline. It has been pointed out² that three answers were given in the sixteenth century to the question, Is the magistrate obliged to maintain the true religion by force? Calvinists and Papists answered in the affirmative, Anabaptists and Brownists in the negative, while civil governments like Elizabeth's held that the magistrate

¹ *V. S.P.T.C.*

² Allen, in Hearnshaw, 185.

had a right to suppress heresy but was not obliged to do so. The Puritans held the first view.¹ This means for Cartwright that "those which would withdraw themselves should be by ecclesiastical discipline at all times, and now also under a godly prince by civil punishment, brought to communicate with their brethren".² Lest we might take this as implying that men are "thrust in their sin to the Lord's table"³ we should add that the Puritan also states that Papists ought not to be compelled to come to the Lord's Supper but that "the magistrate ought to compel them to hear the word of God, and, if they profit not, nor with sufficient teaching correct not themselves, that then they should be punished".⁴ This doctrine assumes that the prince is God's officer, whose duty it is to enforce the true religion, but it does not meet the difficulties raised in such questions as these: Which is the true religion? Who are the best judges of it? If it is a matter of conscience and reason, how can these be coerced? If there is diversity of judgment, which opinion has the better right to be enforced? Is there to be no toleration? Must there be uniformity? Were the Puritans not enunciating a conception that justified their own suppression? Did they not really believe that the only true religion included a belief in Presbyterianism and that that only should be compellable? The answers in brief are that the doctrine implies that a Puritan Presbyterian Church should be established, that uniformity should be enforced, that the Puritan ministers are the best judges, and that

¹ *Second Replie*, 248.

³ *Ibid.* II, 553.

² *W.W.* II, 552.

⁴ *Ibid.* III, 103.

the evils of intolerance would continue, the victims and oppressors changing places, and that the only solution of the problems is contained in a recognition of the rights of all consciences and the principle of toleration.

The Puritans believed that the Church as well as the State had a right and duty to punish heretics and evildoers. It follows from their two-kingdom theory that the ecclesiastical correction differs from the civil; as Cartwright says, in answer to Whitgift's objection that under Presbyterianism a man is punished twice for the same fault, "the Church discipline is the punishment or rather the correction of the Lord: in a far other kinde and to an other end then the civil punishment".¹ The one kind is meant for the instruction of conscience, the other applies to the outward man. Cartwright contends that there is no question of taking the sword out of the magistrate's hands,² and that the magistrate is not made a cipher as Whitgift declares.³ Some faults, for instance, uncomely jesting and choleric speaking, which are not dealt with at all by civil law, come under ecclesiastical discipline.⁴

Capital punishment was a subject to which the Puritans paid considerable attention. They found their directions in the Old Testament, particularly in the so-called Mosaic law which prescribes the death penalty for such sins as blasphemy, idolatry, adultery and murder. Whitgift draws the attention of those

¹ *The Rest*, 71. *V. Full and Plaine*, 162.

² *Second Replie*, 2, 3.

³ *W.W.* III, 264.

⁴ *Second Replie*, 3.

who govern England to the dangerous implications of this doctrine—all the laws of the land contrary to the judicial laws of Moses must be abrogated; the prince must be abridged of the prerogative exercised in the pardoning of those condemned by law to die; lawyers must cast away their textbooks and use exclusively the books of Moses; the clergy must be regarded as the expert judges of the contents of these books and will seek regal dominion over the lawyers.¹ Cartwright contends that the magistrate as the Lord's officer has no power to abrogate the judicial laws of Moses whose equity, substance or marrow is of perpetual validity; the others may be adapted to circumstances of time and place.² He thus gives the magistrate *potestatem facti non juris* and exalts the Church as the arbiter of what is universally and perpetually binding. As one of the arbiters he postulates that God has decreed that capital punishment should for ever be meted out to idolaters, blasphemers, etc.³ He argues that natural law demands death for murder, and that the Mosaic law justly decrees death for adultery—the least of the death-worthy sins—and that therefore the death penalty for the other sins is more equitable still.⁴ He denies that law books must be discarded; they must however be in harmony with the Mosaic law. According to the Puritan the only excuse for the presence of bishops in Parliament is that they may see that there is no discrepancy between the laws of the realm and those of Moses.⁵

Cartwright's views are dominated by the important

¹ *W.W.* 1, 273. ² *Second Replie*, 95, 97, 100. ³ *Ibid.* 100.

⁴ *Ibid.* 101, 102, 103. ⁵ *Ibid.* 104.

and plausible conviction that the severest punishment should be suffered by those who commit the worst offences. Among these are the murder of souls and the dishonouring of God, that is, heresy, idolatry and blasphemy. Besides, these are the root of crimes against society, for instance, theft, murder and treason. Therefore the greatest severity ought to be shown to those guilty of the primary offences. Indeed, the reason why so many thefts, murders, etc.—breaches of the second table of the decalogue—are prevalent is because punishment for breaches of the first table is omitted. “The magistrates”, says Cartwright, “whiche punishe murther and theftes and treasons, with other transgressions off the seconde table severely and are lose in punishinge the breaches off the first table, beginne at the wronge ende.”¹ This logical reasoning requires in those who are, in virtue of the Christian revelation, more enlightened than the Hebrews in their devotion to God, a greater earnestness in the execution of death penalties for offences against God’s glory. Accordingly, Cartwright says that civil discipline ought to be severer under the Gospel than under the Law.² This cruel logic also proves that a deeper interest in the fulfilment of the commands of the first table and a consequent better enforcement of the attached penalties will redound to the good of the commonwealth. “The onelie remedie”, says Cartwright, “of purginge the common wealthe off thes pestilences [murders, thefts, etc.] is to bende the force off sharpe and severe punishmentes, especially againste idolaters, blasphemers, contemners

¹ *Ibid.* 117.

² *Ibid.* Table at end.

of trw religion and off the service off God.”¹ We acknowledge that souls are more important than bodies and that if souls are saved and so filled with love and reverence for God and loyalty to the principles of the first table of the decalogue, they will express themselves in the fruits of righteousness, in good citizenship, in obedience to the commands of the second table. In other words, we believe that the reformation of the heart is the heart of all reformation and that the acceptance of Christ will express itself economically, socially and politically. But while conceding the priority and all importance of the inward regeneration we believe that the argument as put forward by Cartwright is vitiated and damned by its association with the death penalty. We must remember, however, that he sincerely held that he was merely loyal to a divine decree expressly declared by Scripture, that he did not feel himself called upon to ask whether men can be forced by penalties to respect and love God, and that he was certainly right in arguing that if death is due, say, for the murder of a body, it is *a fortiori* due for the murder of a soul, the crime of which heretics and idolaters were guilty. The question is, Would the death penalty be imposed at all by an ideal government?

We have already discussed Cartwright’s “bloody” tenet, that the idolater must die the death even though he repent.² Here we may merely point out that the Puritan believes that it would be more detrimental to the State if idolaters and blasphemers escaped death by their repentance, and that he strengthens his case

¹ *Second Replie*, 118.

² *S.P.T.C.* 90.

by the fact that murderers and traitors do not evade the extreme penalty by repenting of their crimes. He thinks that the allowance of a reprieve for repentance would induce criminals to make a show of sorrow and that thus the commonwealth would be prevented from administering justice.¹ It is indeed arguable—provided that Cartwright's premises regarding the gradation of offences are accepted—that if repentance cannot redeem a murderer from capital punishment, it cannot set free a murderer of souls and a destroyer of true religion, *i.e.* a heretic, an idolater or a blasphemous. But the proviso does not come within the orbit of modern jurisprudence.

While the Puritans looked to the State to administer corporal punishment they held that the Church had a coercive jurisdiction of its own, according to which ecclesiastical penalties are imposed upon defaulters. The chief of these is excommunication. Cartwright teaches that the whole Church has an interest in this, but that the Church officials have the chief "stroke" in it.² Thus to matters of punishment he applies his ideas of democratic and representative government. It is of the greatest interest that the Puritans again look to the Hebrews for guidance on the question of punishment. Both Cartwright and Travers explicitly state that their notions of suspension and excommunication are derived from the practice of the Jewish synagogue.³ Whitgift denies the validity of the synagogal prototype; he points out that the synedrion was a council of civil judges and therefore

¹ *Second Replie*, 108.

² *W.W.* III, 220, 226.

³ *Ibid.* III, 226. *Full and Plaine*, 168.

cannot be taken as the model of a Puritan seigniory.¹ Though in many respects Whitgift was an Erastian before Erastus's work on excommunication was published, it was the Heidelberg Professor of Medicine who dealt most thoroughly with the question of excommunication from the anti-Puritan point of view. We have already shown how the theses of Erastus originated as a counterblast to the doctrine held by an English Puritan and accepted by the authorities in Heidelberg.² Suffice it now to say that Erastianism as propounded by Erastus was a reaction against the two-kingdom theory of Puritanism and a declaration in favour of a single coercive jurisdiction exercised by a State in which the true religion is established.

According to Bishop Bossuet, only an infallible Church is entitled to demand obedience. It is also true that only an infallible Church has a corresponding right to punish the disobedient. The same may be said of an infallible State. The Puritan movement was a pronouncement that the Elizabethan State was not infallible; the opposition of Elizabeth and her bishops was a declaration that Puritanism was not infallible. Both believed in uniformity and in punishment for dissent. Rome held the same beliefs. The Separatists denied the claims of all. Which was entitled to rule and who should be judge? Or was there a more excellent way?

(v) TOLERATION

We shall not enter at large upon the important subject of toleration, which has been dealt with by

¹ *W.W.* III, 227.

² *S.P.T.C.* 133-4.

Figgis, Klein and others. We can only touch upon the relation of Cartwrightian Puritanism to the problem. In the first place it is obvious that the Puritans did not believe in toleration. They could not conceive of more than one true religion, and held that their duty to God bade them seek the furtherance of it and simultaneously the suppression of all that was incompatible with it. They were pledged to uniformity; they were imbued with the moral earnestness of Calvinism; they were attached to a rigorous penal system for the vindication of which they looked to the Scriptures; and they regarded it as the sacred duty of the civil magistrate to put their system into force. Therefore, if in power, the Elizabethan Puritans would doubtless have excelled in intolerance the authorities whose regime they denounced. In all likelihood circumstances would have tended to modify their policy. This we may gather from the views expressed by Walsingham to a deputation of Dutch Calvinists in 1588.¹ In opposition to their desire for religious monopoly he showed that he believed in the expediency of toleration when Romanism was strong and in the inexpediency of it when Protestantism was strong. So political power would probably have turned Puritan governors into Politiques, persecutors whose intolerance waxed and waned with the dangers to the peace and unity of the realm occasioned by dissenting minorities.

Meanwhile they were not in power and were obliged to state their case rather than exercise their claims. They contend for the establishment of a free, self-

¹ Conyers Read, *op. cit.* III, 283-4.

governing, self-sufficient Church, and they base their demands on the dictates of an enlightened conscience. Against Whitgift's opinion that liberty of conscience and freedom from false doctrines were never more enjoyed by the Church of England than in his day,¹ Cartwright affirms that more is required to give the Church complete autonomy, for instance, "to use assemblies for the ministering of the worde and sacramentes, etc. is a libertie of the church".² The Puritan appears to stand on high moral ground when he vindicates the rights of conscience. Whitgift criticises his position because it leads to individualism, contentiousness and licence and charges him with having too exalted an opinion of human nature. Cartwright, however, realises the dangers annexed to the unrestricted exercise of an unenlightened conscience and makes a distinction between "conscience" and "good conscience". The latter "will admit no persuasion but out off the word off God".³ "The Lord", says Cartwright, "knew too well the unreformed corners and false doores of the best consciences to commit his Church which he loved so dearly unto their courteousie."⁴ Thus for the Puritan freedom of conscience means in general liberty to act according to his own interpretation of the word of God, and in particular liberty to set up a Puritan Church with a Presbyterian polity. But what of the others whose interpretation of divine law differs from theirs? All are wrong, for there is only one true religion, and if among the others there is a State

¹ *W.W.* I, 423.

³ *Ibid.* 331.

² *Second Replie*, 261.

⁴ *Ibid.*

claiming absolute supremacy there is bound to be a collision. Whitgift was therefore justified in his view that Cartwright's appeal to conscience meant in practice an attempt to straighten the authority of the magistrate to the Puritan purpose.¹

With "conscience" on both sides there was bound to be an impasse. Persecution and dissent were alike inevitable. This actually happened in Elizabeth's reign. She adhered to her belief in a Free State: the Puritans would not be persuaded that their ideal of a Presbyterian Free Church was wrong. By their claim to liberty of conscience the Puritans prepared the way for that toleration which allowed both State and Church to be free. This they did, not because they believed in toleration for all but because, like other dissenting minorities, they showed that peace in a realm can only be achieved if the rights of conscience are recognised. Out of the conflict between the two ideals—an omnipotent State and a Free Church, a divine monarchy and a divine Presbytery—arose the remedy for the conflict, namely, toleration. The Puritans were allied with Jesuits, Huguenots and Dutchmen in the struggle against the forces of absolute monarchy and the tyranny of civil power, and in spite of themselves they contributed to the furtherance of both civil and religious liberty. We should rather put religious liberty first for that was the primary object of their endeavour and the other followed after.

¹ *W.W.* I, 82.

(vi) THE CHURCH

The Puritans believed in both the invisible and the visible Church, but whereas Luther emphasised the former and so exalted the rights of the State, they emphasised the latter and so diminished the power of the State.¹ They contended for a concrete self-sufficient institution of the kind called by Troeltsch the Church-type as distinguished from the more subjective and personal group called by him the sect-type. Whitgift recognised the new emphasis and accused the Puritans of confusing the invisible and visible Churches.² Undoubtedly the absolute State was bound to look with more jealousy upon a visible than an invisible rival and the dangers of collision were more real.

The visible body "which hathe all the partes off a church" is called by Cartwright an established Church.³ "I speake", he says, "of the church visible, standing off good and evill, of the outward government of the church, which standeth in administring off the word and sacramentes and exercise of all partes off church discipline: and that I have shewed to have all her partes althowghe not all her orna-mentes."⁴ He dissents from Whitgift's view that a Church is not established until it is "allowed by the magistrate". Such allowance he evidently regards as an ornament rather than a necessity. Defining an established Church as one "which hathe one uniforme order grounded owt off the word of God", he denies

¹ *Second Replie*, 171.

³ *Second Replie*, 248.

² *W.W.* I, 392.

⁴ *Ibid.* 249.

that the Church of England is fully entitled to the name, because it is "a church of god wherin (with other thinges well donne) the corruptions which are in yt are by common consent off those which rule the church agreed uppon".¹ There are thus, according to Cartwright, degrees of true establishment. In his opinion the Anglican Church is but partially established and the Presbyterian completely so.

If, as Whitgift says, no Church can be established unless by a Christian magistrate, then the primitive Church was not established.² Cartwright, however, believes that the Apostolic Church was established and that it is absurd to say that ministers now with the help of the magistrate can build a better Church than the master-builders, the Apostles, did.³ He grants that if the magistrate is head of the Church no Church can be established without him, but holds that seeing Christ is the head Whitgift's case falls to the ground.⁴ Whitgift replies that the Church may be established in doctrine and spiritual government in times of persecution, but not as it is established in outward government under a Christian prince.⁵ Cartwright concedes that although the Church can be established without the magistrate it cannot live in quiet without him.⁶ The difference is thus largely terminological. An established Church for the Puritans is one with a proper constitution—the Latin word used by them for the corresponding verb is *constituere*⁷—but for their opponents it is a Church recognised and

¹ *Ibid.* 34.

² *W.W.* I, 389.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.* I, 390.

⁵ *Ibid.* I, 391.

⁶ *Ibid.* I, 390.

⁷ *Eccl. Disc.* 41, 143 *verso*.

maintained by the State. The latter is the meaning generally attached to an ecclesiastical Establishment in modern times. It should however be remembered that the Puritans aimed at the realisation of both ideas. They wanted a Church duly constituted. That meant for them a Presbyterian Church. The constitution was the *sine qua non* of the Church; in virtue of it the Church had a "face". The State connection was not essential but it was desirable. It was an ornament. The Cartwrightians strove for both "partes" and "ornaments", a Church doubly established.¹

An established Church, in modern parlance, is generally endowed, part of its endowment being regarded as its patrimony handed down in the shape of tithes and other commodities from the past. The Puritans did not object to the retention of the endowments in a Presbyterian Church. It was the Separatists who were the pioneers of voluntarism. For instance, when Barrow said that tithes were abrogated and unlawful he was asked by Burghley "Why, thou wouldest have the minister live of somewhat; whereof should he live?" "*Ex pura eleemosyna*", said Barrow, "of clear alms, as Christ in his Testament hath ordained, and as he and his Apostles". "But how", asked Burghley, "if the people will not give?" "Such are not the people of God", was the reply.² Cartwright and Travers, however, declare in

¹ The Brownists and Barrowists did not regard the parish assemblies as true established churches. According to them only a congregation of believers was a true establishment.—*Exam. of Barrow, etc.* 12.

² *Ibid.* 20.

favour of the use of part at least of the tithes for the maintenance of the ministry.¹ "If", writes Cartwright, "the fat morsels of our bishoprics and archbishoprics were taken and employed to their uses of maintenance of the poor, and of the ministers, and of the universities, which are the seed of the ministry, I think the heat of the disputation and contention for archbishops and bishops would be well cooled."² Whitgift insinuated that the Puritans and their "fautors" had more interest in the livings than the functions of bishops and probably there was more than a grain of truth in his words. When we think of the new lords created by the spoils of monasteries and abbeys in the time of Henry VIII and the enthusiasm they manifested in the suppression of the Church upon whose ruins they throve, or of the ravages made upon the Church properties by the Lords of the Congregation in Scotland, we can the more readily believe that some of the influential patrons of Puritanism, for instance Leicester himself, were animated by mercenary motives, and that the desire for plunder was one of the pillars upon which the Puritan court party rested.³

(vii) CIRCUMSTANCES

The relation of political thought to circumstances is illustrated by Puritanism. As a rule Cartwright teaches that Presbyterianism is an immutable system, divinely decreed to be the polity of the Christian Church irrespective of circumstances. It does not

¹ *V. Full and Plaine*, 126.

² *W.W.* II, 321.

³ *V. S.P.T.C.* 266, n. 2.

necessarily depend upon a godly magistrate; it can exist without him. He denies that "the times alter the government".¹ His chief reason is that the Apostolic Church, which in his opinion was Presbyterian, was given as the perfect and perpetual model. Whitgift, on the other hand, contends that the form of ecclesiastical government is dependent upon time and place, that the Apostolic Church is not a model for all time, and that one element alone—the absence of a Christian magistrate—prevents the early Church from being taken as such.² Whitgift argues that in the Apostolic age, which was a time of persecution when there was no Christian magistrate, there may have been seniors, the people had naturally much to do with the new organisation, deacons for the poor were more necessary than now, and the distinction between Church and State was inevitable, but that the Christian monarch and the Christian State have no need of seniors or deacons, eliminate popular government and make the distinction between Church and State an anachronism.³ Cartwright, however, will not allow the advent of the Christian magistrate to be taken as a predominating circumstance affecting Church government. Working on his two-kingdom theory he says that seniors do not intermeddle with the function of a magistrate, godly or ungodly, and that therefore there is "no reason why the magistrate entering into the Church the elder should be thrust out".⁴ Indeed, the alteration of circumstances makes for the greater need of elders,

¹ *W.W.* III, 176.

² *Ibid.* I, 417.

³ *Ibid.* III, 166, 289; I, 27, 388, 393.

⁴ *Ibid.* III, 167.

because the ministers now require more assistance than those who lived when the gifts of the Spirit were more plentiful.¹ But the determining factor should not be the suitability or unsuitability of a divinely ordained system to fleeting circumstances; whether we think it impossible or hard to work or unprofitable or otherwise is beside the point, seeing it has been commanded by a God Who "will plane the ways be they never so rough".² Cartwright's defiance of circumstance is not maintained when he discusses the office of widows. He says that now there is not the same need of them to look after the poor and sick "as there was in those places where the churches were first founded". Then there were the victims of persecution who needed care and the great heat of the eastern countries necessitated much washing. But because there are sick and poor in each Church still, he does not see how a more convenient order could be devised and concludes "that (if such may be gotten) we ought also to keep that order of widows in the church still".³ We note, therefore, that the Puritan does take account of circumstances and wonder whether he really accepted what he considered the commands of Scripture in favour of Presbyterianism because they were expressly given by God, or because they were for other reasons approved by him and in his opinion best suited to the times in which he lived.

We are led to believe that Cartwright's views were, in spite of his protest against a circumstantial philosophy or an ecclesiastical pragmatism, coloured by the circumstances of his own age. As a nationalist,

¹ *Ibid.* III, 178.

² *Ibid.* III, 186.

³ *Ibid.* III, 292.

humanist and Calvinist he was influenced by the *Zeitgeist*; his views on uniformity, toleration and capital punishment would have been different in a later century; and the movement he represented could not escape the pressure of circumstances. It is indeed most remarkable how the political aspects of Protestantism in general were affected by events. As we read the writings of the reformers from Luther onwards we are struck by the large number of them that may be called *livres de circonstance*. The accession of Mary Tudor and the massacre of St Bartholomew were circumstances that provoked a decided political reaction in Calvinistic ranks.¹ The accession of Elizabeth and the fact that there was no Bartholomew massacre during her reign constituted circumstances to which the Puritan reaction was bound to be less violent than that of Knox and Goodman to Mary, or of Beza, Hotman, and Mornay to the Machiavellian deed of 1572. Elizabeth herself was really the dominant circumstance to which Puritanism had to attune its political principles. She was a confirmed opportunist, adapting her policy to the changes of circumstance and ever giving the safety and unity of her realm a foremost place in her mind. The Puritan principle of tarrying for the magistrate had accordingly to become a policy of outmanœuvring a skilled time-server. Controversy could not win the day; so Puritan moderates ceased their polemics. Sheer non-conformity could not win royal favour; so men like

¹ Note how Huguenots and the League exchanged political creeds when Henry of Navarre came to the French throne. V. Gooch, 19.

Cartwright counselled compromise on unessentials like the apparel. Constitutional reform alone was feasible; so the synodical discipline was put into practice only so far as was consistent with the laws of the land and Parliament was approached to extend and consummate the movement. The only Puritan who succeeded in winning Elizabeth to the support of Puritan ideals was Walsingham, who had learned Machiavellianism in Padua and was called a Machiavellian by James VI, but his conquests were in the realm of foreign policy and were achieved because the Queen was forced by circumstances to see that for the time the Secretary's aims coincided with those that served her own interests. In their chief domestic policy the Puritans had to keep on tarrying in hope for another magistrate. The rising sun was but another of the many circumstances which shaped the Puritan movement.

(viii) SCRIPTURE

The Puritans professed to find their ideas in Scripture, but they frequently found there just what they sought. They assumed that Church government is of the substance of the Gospel and that matters of discipline are necessary to faith,¹ or as William Ames put it that Christ did not die intestate but "before his death settled his own domestical concernments".² They accordingly expected to discover in the New Testament the system of ecclesiastical government ordained by God, and bringing a distinctive mode of

¹ *W.W.* I, 181, 364.

² Preface to W. Bradshaw's *English Puritanism* (ed. 1660).

interpretation to bear upon the New Testament they met with their Presbyterian model in the Apostolic Church. Other minds, for instance Whitgift's, could see no prescribed system of Church government in Scripture at all. We therefore conclude that the Puritans looked for their model with minds prepared in a certain direction. We are convinced that they looked for what they saw, and that they based their beliefs as much upon reason as upon the express word of God, or, to put the same thing otherwise, upon revelation as interpreted by their own rational preconceptions. Whitgift charged Cartwright with making Scriptural texts prove what he wanted them to prove, with turning the Bible into a nose of wax,¹ and we think that the accusation was justified. If a Scriptural event does not fit in with his theory Cartwright calls it "extraordinary"; or he states that one fact does not make a rule, but that the continual practice of the Apostles must be considered; or arbitrarily and without exegetical warrant he uses texts to support Presbyterian tenets—Rom. xii to prove that there were elders, *Dic Ecclesiae* that the Church must have an eldership, and Acts i and vi that popular election is necessary.² It is, however, apparent that Cartwright bases his arguments on more than the explicit words of the Bible. He invokes the light of reason to prove that popular election is right.³ He appeals to the "wise and reasonable man which maketh his account of likelihoodes" as an authority for his opinions.⁴ He makes much of conscience as

¹ *W.W.* III, 33, 163.

² *Ibid.* I, 300. *Second Replie*, 159.

³ *W.W.* I, 300.

⁴ *Second Replie*, 234.

a guide. He seeks support from antiquity and also from the judgments of writers old and new. In many of the summaries of his arguments he gives excellent instances of the way in which he grounds his conclusions not on a bare Scriptural injunction or fact, but on that as interpreted by himself and on the authority of reason and precedent.¹ When therefore Cartwright expounds principles that have or may have a political implication, we expect to find him referring to Scripture for example and warrant, but we realise that he will discover only that which fits into his preconceptions. He was well aware that the Old Testament in particular was full of political history,² but he used his own biased reason to interpret it, for instance, to support his two-kingdom theory or capital punishment for idolatry. The Puritan appeal to Scripture was largely an attempt to ground beliefs, already held, on an authority regarded as divine and was therefore a species of what the new psychologists call rationalisation. The real reason why the Puritans held many of their distinctive tenets was not necessarily because Scripture enjoined them; they sought Scriptural support because they already believed in or were inclined to such tenets.

It is not easy to determine with precision the influences that gave them their bias. The comprehensive word "circumstance" accounts for much. The Puritans were children of the Renaissance and the Reformation and they were Englishmen living in the time of Elizabeth. As such they looked to the past

¹ *Ibid.* 292. *The Rest*, 30-31, 72-3, 114-15.

² *S.P.T.C.* 225.

to inspire their criticism of the present, they faced their problems in the spirit of revolt from Rome, they were imbued with personal piety and moral earnestness, they laid stress upon the value of the individual and also of the nation. Their movement was not an isolated phenomenon; it had precursors and contemporaries and was doubtless influenced by both. We can trace much that is common to them and the exponents of the conciliar principle, for instance, Nicholas de Cusa, and their immediate debt to Calvinism is obvious. Cartwright sums up in himself most of these influences. He appears first of all as a humanist; then he assumes the rôle of a New Testament exegete; his personal religion is a dominant feature of his whole life. His contacts with Geneva, Scotland, France, Holland and Heidelberg represent the connection of Puritanism with the centres of advanced political as well as religious ideas, and his loyalty to Queen and country represents the element in the Puritan movement that kept it typically English.

(ix) CONCLUSION

Almost as soon as Cartwright began to expound his Presbyterian principles they were regarded as politically dangerous. Whitgift was the first to point out in detail their political implications. He showed that the anti-episcopal opinions were really anti-monarchical and would have as much force if applied to the prince as they had when directed against a bishop. He feared that if the people became acquainted with the Puritan doctrines they would turn them

against the civil government.¹ He drew the attention of the authorities, including the Queen herself, to the political menace enshrouded in the Puritan cloak.² He pointed out the threat to the royal supremacy in the Puritan ideas of spiritual independence, sovereignty and obedience; he classed the Puritans with the Papists in their advocacy of similar principles;³ he uttered his trumpet call against the invasion of the rights of the State by the claims of clericalism; he predicted that Cartwright's opinions regarding conscience and liberty would tend to Anabaptist licence and anarchy;⁴ he dreaded the breeding of disloyalty among Papists and the populace if the Presbyterian tenets were allowed to spread.⁵ As a typical utterance of Whitgift's regarding the political danger we may cite the following:

The reasons that you use for the popular or aristocratical government of the Church, when they come among the people, will be easily transferred to the state of the commonweal, and peradventure breed that misliking of civil government that you would now have of ecclesiastical, to a further inconvenience and mischief than you and all yours will be able to remedy. In the meantime you utterly overthrow the queen's authority in ecclesiastical matters given unto her by the laws of God.⁶

Whether Whitgift's foreboding was justified or not, whether Puritanism held *in gremio* the political influences which he saw in it or not, we believe that the Puritans did not deliberately or primarily lay

¹ *W.W.* I, 478.

² *Ibid.* III, II, 467.

³ *Ibid.* I, 25, 57, II4, II9.

⁴ *Ibid.* I, 57, 61, 77, 80, 82, 83, 95, 100 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.* I, 76, 110, 122, 273, 344; II, 19, 114, 239, 398-9; III, 198.

⁶ *Ibid.* II, 239.

down a political programme. Their interest was in the ecclesiastical system rather than the civil, in Presbyterianism rather than politics. When, therefore, Whitgift accuses them of "pushing at" and "shooting at" the State and its head,¹ Cartwright warmly repudiates the allegation. The Puritan regards the charge as a queering of the pitch, complains that he and his fellows have been misrepresented to the Queen and Council as political agitators, condemns Whitgift for ever pulling at the magistrate's sword as if Puritanism should be put down by force as a seditious movement, and earnestly desires that the civil authorities may examine his principles for themselves and so realise their non-political intention.² He reminds his accuser that Christ Himself was charged with being an enemy of Caesar, and is of the opinion that the destruction of Episcopacy does not involve the hurt of the State.

"The Pharisees", writes Cartwright, "when our Saviour Christ inveighed against their ambition, accused him that he was no friend to Caesar, and went about to discredit him with the civil magistrate: you shall apply it yourself; you will needs make the archbishop, etc., neighbours unto the civil magistrates; and yet they almost dwell as far asunder as Rome and Jerusalem, and as Sion and St Peter's Church there; so that the house of the archbishop may be burnt stick and stone, when not so much as the smoke shall approach the house of the civil magistrate."³

We think that our study of the Puritan movement confirms Whitgift's suspicion that it teemed with political implications, does not disprove the Puritan

¹ *W.W.* I, 344; II, 281.

² *Ibid.* I, 123, 144; III, 466.

³ *Ibid.* I, 398.

avowal of a sincere non-political purpose, and demonstrates that, when Cartwright thought that there was a great gulf fixed between his programme and politics, he was blind to the political potentialities of Presbyterianism. We also believe that the very charges which Cartwright rebutted made him indulge in political views that otherwise would not have been expressed and so gave his *livres de circonstance* a share of the political atmosphere into which Whitgift had dragged the controversy.

From the point of view of the Elizabethan State there were undoubtedly dangers inherent in Presbyterianism. Elizabeth would have been shorn of the glory of regal omnipotence by an autonomous Church; the reign of clericalism would have abridged her powers and privileges. If the principles of Presbyterian government had been applied to the State a limited monarchy would have ensued, representative and local government would have been developed, and the centralisation of the absolutist State would have been destroyed. This change would have been natural—in spite of Cartwright's protestations to the contrary—in a country whose citizens believed in Presbyterianism, for their minds were not likely to hold two diverse or contradictory sets of governmental principles. Further, there was the risk that the Puritan tenets might become even more radical in the minds of nonconformists who believed that they were carrying them to their logical conclusion; for instance, Separatists cherished the two-kingdom theory but severed the Hippocratic bond, accepted the doctrine of popular sovereignty and

made it less restricted than the Presbyterians did, and cut out the policy of tarrying for the magistrate altogether. Elizabeth, Whitgift, Bancroft and other protagonists of the *status quo* were, therefore, from their point of view, justified in regarding Puritanism as a political danger and the suppression of it as an urgent duty. To foster it was to prepare a rod for their own backs.

These political dangers may have been very real to Elizabeth, James VI, and any other monarchs who believed in the divine right of kings, but it does not follow that Presbyterianism as such is politically pernicious. Indeed the principles for which Cartwright and his disciples contended have been largely incorporated in the modern State. The mixed State of which the Puritans dreamed has become fulfilled in a constitutional monarchy; the relation between Church and State has not been solved but in some countries, for instance, Scotland, the two-kingdom theory of the Puritans has been to a large extent realised and received the recognition of the State; indeed, the modern State has in many respects become Presbyterianised.

Although Cartwright believed that his platform was politically innocuous and meant it to be so, the pressure of circumstances gradually brought out the political implications and potentialities of Puritanism. Even the exigencies of controversy made him more political than he intended to be and forced him incidentally to assert, for instance, that monarchy is not a necessity and that prince and parliament can change it. The growth of a patronal court party, the

appeal to Parliament and the development of a Puritan party in the House of Commons, and the reaction to the needs of foreign Puritans—Huguenots, Dutchmen, Scots—all combined to make the movement more and more political.¹ The Puritans themselves recognised a development in the aims of the movement, but they regarded it as the result of widening vision: the later Puritans saw more to reform than the earlier.² We however must resist the temptation to pursue the subject into the seventeenth century when political Puritanism came to its height. We may merely state that the Stuart policy, which really began as a reaction to Puritanism of the Scottish kind, drove nonconformity into the political paths, that the successes and excesses of dissent during the civil war were largely the fulfilment of Whitgift's fears and showed what Puritanism could do when it had the power, and that eventually—when the twin children, a Free State and a Free Church, are born of the collision between the irresistible and immovable antagonists, an absolutist State and a Church based on an uncompellable conscience—political Puritanism has one of its chief aims realised and may rest in peace.

Historians are faced with the danger of ignoring the religious roots of political thought and of failing, owing to an inadequate psychological analysis, to

¹ To do justice to these aspects and applications of Puritanism another treatise, which would deal *inter alia* with the aims and activities of Puritan diplomatists in Scottish affairs and the motives that inspired Puritan seamen in their anti-Spanish exploits, is still required.

² Ames, Preface to W. Bradshaw's *English Puritanism* (ed. 1660).

discern that the motives which animated the Protestant reformers were primarily religious. "To the end of his life", says Gardiner,¹ "Cromwell was interested first in religion and then in politics." Knox and Andrew Melville were first and foremost devotees of God and Christ: their ecclesiastico-political creed and conduct were but the expression of their religion. Cartwright and his fellows exemplify the same thesis. The Puritan was obviously reluctant to enter into the political lists and was forced to do so in spite of himself; above and beyond his politics or even his Presbyterianism there lay his Puritanism; and the primary interest for a Puritan is neither political nor ecclesiastical but religious.

¹ *Cromwell's Place in History*, 23.

Chapter Six

EXCURSUS ON ARISTOTELIANISM IN PURITANISM

PROFESSOR Barker says: "It might seem, *a priori*, as if the coming of the Reformation and the emergence of the nation-state in the sixteenth century would be the signal for a return—the first return—to Aristotle's conception of the State".¹ This pre-supposition is founded upon the fact that the State was now emancipated from the domination of the Church and upon the fact that the new nation-state was more capable of the political consciousness that characterised the Greek city-state than had been possible in the mediaeval Empire or Church.

That under the influence of the Renaissance thirteen editions and twelve Latin translations of and six commentaries on Aristotle's *Politics* were published in the sixteenth century,² is sufficient to suggest that the political philosophy of Aristotle had entered into a new vogue and that Protestantism had made an alliance with Aristotelianism.

Professor Barker, however, observes: "The Reformation was, if anything, hostile to the old Aristotelian view of the State. And the reason was that in the thirteenth century the Mediaeval Church had adopted

¹ *Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*, 500.

² Oncken, *Staatslehre*, I, 79.

Aristotle; and the Reformation rejected Aristotle as one of the mediaeval superstitions”.

We feel that this view of the Protestant Church attitude requires qualification. We concede that the political philosophers who advocated absolutist principles and the divine right of monarchy would naturally regard with disfavour the Greek thinker who denounced the vices of tyranny and exalted the virtues of a mixed constitution. We realise that Hobbes in the interest of monarchy savagely attacked Aristotle and considered his influence inimical to civil government. We also note that in the seventeenth century only one translation and two reprints of old editions of the *Politics* were published,¹ which seems to indicate that the prestige of that book was on the wane.

The decline of Aristotle's political influence from the middle of the sixteenth century till towards the end of the eighteenth century was due, not so much to an antipathy engendered in Protestant minds against him because his philosophy had been used as a support of the Roman Church against imperial and national rivals, but chiefly to the fact that modern political science began to assert itself as a departmental abstract scheme of thought, which divorced ethics from politics and in the interest of state-centralisation or, on the contrary, in order to assert the rights of religion against state absolutism, made the chief object of its study a demoralised State—the antithesis of the Aristotelian ideal.² Accordingly, until Rousseau, Hegel and others of their time and afterwards came

¹ Oncken, *Staatslehre*, 1, 79.

² Barker, *op. cit.* 519 ff.

to regard the State as the embodiment of moral and spiritual principles, and in a large measure applied the philosophy of the old Greek πόλις to the modern nation, the Aristotelian political creed remained discounted or discredited.

Nevertheless there was a section of the Protestant world which did not altogether partake of this reactionary attitude to Aristotle. This was the Puritan Presbyterian party, and we shall now set ourselves to examine the affinities between their programme and the political thought of Aristotle and trace as far as we can the influence of the Greek philosopher upon Puritanism.

There are several *prima facie* resemblances between characteristic elements in the Puritan Presbyterian polity and dominant features of Aristotle's political scheme which suggest that the former—even although it was ostensibly drawn from Scriptural sources—was indebted to Aristotle for its systematisation or confirmation. Cartwright speaks of some of his positions, which he regards as divinely ordained, as being also "warranted with reasons"¹ and our task is to enquire whether any of his reasons were Aristotelian. First of all we may note the parallels between the two systems.

(i) The Greek city-state, with its limited dimensions and intense political consciousness, was the only type of commonwealth with which Aristotle dealt. He lived before the facts of world-empires and nation-states contributed corresponding ideas to Greek, Roman and Christian political thought. His outlook

¹ *The Rest*, 114.

was in a sense parochial or municipal. The early Puritan Presbyterians made an ecclesiastical city-state the central feature of their programme.¹

(ii) Aristotle held that ethics and politics should be indissolubly united and regarded the State as the embodiment of moral purpose. The Puritans looked upon the Church organisation as directed to the fulfilment of moral and religious ends. The Greek thinker believed that the State should conform to definite *a priori* principles, the Puritans that the Church was designed to express irrefragable divine commands.

(iii) The Aristotelian view that the State is an organic whole served by component parts distinguished by differentiated functions is paralleled by the Puritan conception of the Church as an organism, whose end is fulfilled by specialised officials in co-operation with the consenting body which they serve.

(iv) The limited franchise in the old city-state and the exclusion of slaves from citizenship altogether finds its resemblance in the restriction of the ecclesiastical franchise by the Puritans to fully qualified members of the Church and their refusal to identify these members with the inhabitants of the parish.

(v) The mixed constitution of the Aristotelian State has its parallel in the Presbyterian polity, Christ the Head, the office-bearers and the general members of the congregation representing the principles of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy respectively.

(vi) The dominant place given to the middle class of society in Aristotle's theoretical State is recalled

¹ *V. supra*, 101.

by the fact that Puritanism, whether in Geneva, France, Holland, Scotland or England, was essentially a middle class movement, whose strength lay in the rising industrial and commercial inhabitants of boroughs and cities, and the smaller gentry and yeomanry of the country.

(vii) Aristotle recognised the rights of the people and the collective insight of a popular assembly, and a similar recognition is made by the Puritans in their emphasis on the right of a congregation to have an interest in the election of its ministers, the excommunication of its members, etc., in their express depreciation of the monarchical principles of a diocesan Episcopacy, and in their corresponding exaltation of the collective rule of an eldership.

It should be noted that these apparent parallels are made between the city-state of Aristotle and the parochial commonwealth which bulked so largely in the programme of the earlier Puritans. They could be added to if we take into consideration the fuller Presbyterian scheme of a hierarchy of Church courts in the so-called "synodical discipline", which though present at the beginning of the Puritan movement took some years to reach its complete development. In this articulated system we may observe more closely a parallel with Aristotle's *κοινωνία κοινωνιῶν* and his associational conceptions. Withal, however, the suggested parallels are only apparent. We realise that it may be fanciful to deduce from them the direct or even indirect influence of Aristotelian thought; and we are aware that it has been pointed out that Laudianism, in postulating the need of

habituation by means of ritual, in conceiving man as necessarily a part of an ecclesiastical group, in regarding the life of the Church as a natural development, is akin to Aristotelianism, and that Puritanism, with its individualism and its opposition to the development theory of the Church, is more akin to Cynicism.¹ Nevertheless, we hold that the Puritan belief in the above-mentioned conceptions which are apparently akin to Aristotle's political thought—even though they were drawn primarily from the Scriptures, from Geneva, or elsewhere—was reinforced and given supplementary warrant by the very fact that they had won the adherence of Aristotle. This position we would be more justified in maintaining if we could demonstrate that the early Puritans were intimately acquainted with Aristotle's teaching and, better still, expressly regarded him as an authoritative guide in the domain of philosophical and political principles.

A notable confession of his faith in Aristotle is given by Cartwright himself in his oration before Queen Elizabeth in 1564.² In the course of his disputation he definitely allies himself with the principles of mixed government advocated by Aristotle, and concludes his argument against absolute monarchy with a repudiation of his opponent's citation of Homer as an authority in favour of a single ruler and with the enunciation of his preference for the contrary teaching of Aristotle: *Profer mihi Homerum philosophorum Aristotelem*. This explicit declaration reveals Cartwright's acquaintance with and reverence for the Greek philosopher and his definite adoption of certain

¹ Barker, *op. cit.* 247, n. 2.

² *S.P.T.C.* App. i.

aspects of Aristotle's political creed. It should, of course, be noted that Cartwright thus proclaims himself a disciple of Aristotle before the Puritan Presbyterian movement was launched; but though in his oration he speaks as an academic humanist utilising weapons drawn from the arsenal of classical antiquity, his words are sufficient to suggest that he would take into that movement an Aristotelian bias of mind, and we have to remember that it was only six years afterwards that he became the chief exponent of Presbyterianism in England.

Turning now to Cartwright's ecclesiastical writings we pursue our search for allusions to the Greek philosopher.

When arguing against non-residence and in favour of the attachment of a minister to a single congregation instead of a diocese, Cartwright says:

It is not nothing that Aristotle disputeth against Plato his community, which would have all things common, and that all men indifferently should have care of all things, and should have nothing which he should say to be his own. For therein Aristotle said very well that that which was cared for of all men was neglected of all and cared for of none;¹ so that the preservation of wife, or children, or of any other possession was then the best and surest when as every man had a certain possession committed unto him, which he should care for and take charge of. And so the Lord his wisdom was, for the better surety and salvation of his church, not to make many ministers, which should in common and indifferently take care of all, but ordained that the church should be divided in divers parts, and that every one should have a piece to care for and to give account for.²

¹ Ἦκιστα γὰρ ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνει τὸ πλείστων κοινόν.

² *W.W.* I, 521.

"What", replies Whitgift, "hath Aristotle to do with non-residence? Authority is scarce when his help is required," and he proceeds to show that Aristotle taught devotion to the whole as well as care for a part of the commonwealth. In other arguments of Cartwright for the allocation of one cure to one minister, for instance, that thereby pastor and flock become intimately acquainted,¹ or that otherwise "it is as much as if either the surgeon should apply his plaster, or the physician his medicine, when they neither know of the wound or disease of their patients",² we breathe the atmosphere of the small ideal city-state of Aristotle and meet anew its ruler with the qualities of a good shepherd and a good physician, but the above-mentioned appeal to Aristotle's authority is the only explicit one made by Cartwright in this connection.

The Aristotelian doctrine of the mean, analysed in the *Ethics* and applied to States in the *Politics*, is frequently referred to by Cartwright as an underlying principle of Puritanism. He affirms that it inspires the Puritan opposition to Roman Catholic abuses retained in the Church of England.

"Philosophy, which is nothing else but reason", he says, "teacheth that, if a man will draw one from vice which is an extreme unto virtue which is the mean, it is the best way to bring him as far from that vice as may be, and that it is safer and less harm for him to be led somewhat too far than he should be suffered to remain within the borders and confines of that vice wherewith he is infected. As if a man would bring a drunken man to sobriety, the best and nearest way is to carry him as far from his excess in drink as may be; and,

¹ *W.W.* I, 520.

² *Ibid.* I, 514.

if a man could not keep a mean, it were better to fault in prescribing less than he should drink, than to fault in giving him more than he ought; as we see, to bring a stick which is crooked to be straight, we do not only bow it so far until it come to be straight, but we bend it so far until we make it so crooked of the other side as it was before of the first side, to this end that at the last it may stand straight, and as it were in the midway between both the crooks.”¹

Whitgift in reply says: “Is this divinity? Indeed such divinity it is that Aristotle, a profane philosopher, doth teach in his Ethics, but not that Christ and his Apostles do teach in the gospel”.² Cartwright answers that he does not regard the method of proceeding to a counter-extreme in order to secure the golden mean an ideal rule, but an expedient choice of the lesser of two evils, that is, a negative attitude to Romanism is better than the maintenance of Romanism itself.³ In his *Second Replie* Cartwright again shows his allegiance to the Aristotelian principle of the mean:

If the church without the Archbishop and Archdeacon be a bodie consisting of all the partes, comely knit together, wherein nothing wanteth, nor nothing is to much: then it followeth, that thes offices bring nether ornament nor accomplishment to the church, but make onely an unprofitable knob and lump off flesh, to the both disfiguring and hinderance off the growght off the bodie.⁴

Thus he signifies that Presbyterianism must be the perfect ecclesiastical system because it avoids both excess and deficiency and bodies forth the Aristotelian

¹ *Ibid.* II, 442.

² *Ibid.* II, 443.

³ *The Rest*, 174. Against Whitgift's belief in *Abusus non tollit usum* Cartwright asserts that contrary diseases must have contrary remedies.—*W.W.* III, 127.

⁴ *Second Replie*, 459.

mean. In the *Rest of the Second Replie* (1577) he reaffirms his advocacy of "a mean which is to be houlden" between the government by one and government by many stating "that as the comodity of having the church iudgmentes handled by a company is to be sowght after: so the inconvenience and confusion of assembling a great multitude for every ecclesiastical case that may befall, is to be avoided".¹

As an application of the characteristic Greek virtue of moderation and an embodiment of the mean, the mixed constitution applauded by Aristotle is accepted by Cartwright, who frequently expounds its merits and shows that it is established in his Presbyterian system.

"It were easy to shew", he writes, "moe lawful forms of common wealths then three. Likewise, that althowgh common wealthes have their names of that which beareth the cheif sway: yet that they are, to their profit, tempered and mixed one with another, singularly the monarchy. This is to be seen namely in our land, where to the passing of divers thinges, the consent of the Parliament is so required, as that without yt those matters can not pas."²

The *locus classicus* in Cartwright's writings, in which he announces his faith in the mixed state and his belief that its principles are embodied in Presbyterianism, is as follows:

The church is governed with that kind of government which the philosophers that write of the best commonwealths affirm to be the best. For, in respect of Christ the head, it is a monarchy; and in respect of the ancients and pastors

¹ *The Rest*, 66-7.

² *Ibid.* 67. Margin, Arist. *Eth. b. lib. ca.* 10. Arist. *Rhet. ad Theod. i. lib.*

that govern in common and with like authority amongst themselves, it is an aristocracy, or the rule of the best men; and in respect that the people are not secluded but have their interest in church-matters, it is a democracy, or a popular estate. An image whereof appeareth also in the policy of this realm; for as in respect of the queen her majesty, it is a monarchy, so in respect of the most honourable council, it is an aristocracy, and having regard to the parliament, which is assembled of all estates, it is a democracy.¹

In his treatment of the problem of the changes to which the forms of government are liable, Cartwright is again reminiscent of Aristotle. He holds that the polity of the true Church is Presbyterian and immutable.² To prove that the aristocratic element in it is not likely to become oligarchic, or the democratic element anarchic, he points out that such conversions or perversions are more likely to take place under a tyrant than under a godly magistrate whose duty and right it is to prevent them, and that seeing these did not happen in the Apostolic age when heathen emperors ruled they are not likely to occur under a Christian sovereign.

"Those that be learned", he writes, "know that the government of the church which was in the Apostles' time, being partly in respect of the people that had to do in the elections and other things popular, partly in respect of the pastors and ancients aristocratical, that is, the rule of the best, I say that they know that these governments do easily decline into their contraries; and by reason thereof both the

¹ *W.W.* I, 390. We find an echo of this passage in Martin Marprelate.—*S.P.T.C.* 284. Cf. Conciliar writers who support their view of the polity of the Church as a mixed state by an appeal to Aristotle.—*Social and Pol. Ideas...of the Renaissance and the Reformation*, ed. Hearnshaw, 82.

² *W.W.* II, 356.

government of those which were most virtuous might easily be changed into the government of few of the richest, or of greatest power; and the popular estate might easily pass to a confused tumult. Now this incommmodity were they more subject unto under a tyrant than under a godly magistrate," etc.¹

In support of an aspect of his two-kingdom theory, namely, that ministers should not occupy civil offices and that civil magistrates should not meddle with ecclesiastical affairs, Cartwright cites both Aristotle and Plato:

Even those commonwealth philosophers, which do license upon occasion that two offices may meet in one man, hold that it is best and convenientest, that every one should have a particular charge. For Aristotle saith it is most agreeable to nature that *ἐν* should be *πρὸς ἐν*, that is, one instrument to one use. And Plato useth the proverb *μηδ' Ἡρακλῆς πρὸς δύο*, against those which will take upon them divers vocations and not content themselves with one; and they make the meeting of many functions in one man to be a remedy only in extreme need and poverty of able men.²

Walter Travers, who shared with Cartwright the leadership of the Elizabethan Presbyterians, and was probably the author of *Ecclesiasticae Disciplinae* (1574), an exposition of Presbyterianism, and was certainly one of the chief compilers of the Puritan Book of Discipline (*Disciplina Sacra*), refers³ to the Presby-

¹ *W.W.* III, 180-1.

² *Ibid.* III, 428.

³ "Atque haec de Ecclesiastici senatus summa in Ecclesia gubernanda auctoritate dicta fuit. Unde quo genere Reipub. Ecclesia gubernetur, satis intelligi potest, quum *ἐκ τοῦ κυρίου* (id est eius quod principatum in Repub. obtinet) descriptione, Reipublicae forma fere aestimari soleat. Itaque quum delectorum hominum & omni pietate atque virtute praestantium consilio atque auctoritate administrentur, *ἀριστοκρατεῖαν* vel potius

terian system as such a mixed state as would have won the approval of Plato, Aristotle and the best philosophers, a combination of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, "wherein", to quote Cartwright's free translation, "all the cytezens obediently submit them selves to god which commandeth as kinge and monarche, and the assembly which decreeth by his will and authoritie, where also the assembly decreeth no weighty matter without the consent and approbation off the rest off the churche and people".¹

We might easily furnish allusions to Greek and particularly to Aristotelian philosophy in the writings of laymen connected with the Puritan movement—for instance, Walsingham expressly commended the study of Aristotle's *Politics* to one of his nephews²—but we believe that we have given sufficient first hand evidence to warrant several important conclusions.

Our enquiry leads us to affirm that there are many definite affinities between Puritanism and Aristote-

θεοκρατείαν appellare licet: quum ne illi quidem nisi ex Dei verbo atque imperio quicquam gerant. Hanc autem optimates auctoritatem ita exercent, ut intelligant, se nullum civile atque politicum imperium exercere, & se populo Dei preesse, ut nihil hic violentum sit, nihil tyrannicum aut *ὀλιγαρχικόν*, sed populi etiam consensus ad auctoritatem suam (in rebus praesertim gravioribus, ut magistratibus mandandis, aut reo damnando) adiungent...ut omnium potius consensu (qui verbo Dei parent, & ex illius mandato Ecclesiam administrari cupiunt) quam paucorum auctoritate Ecclesia gubernari videatur, & hac in parte democratiam referat. Quae omnia quum in eand. societatem convenerunt (ut Platoni placet atque Aristo. caeterisque summis Philosophis) plane divinam esse necesse est, in qua nimirum omnes cives se ad Dei viventis, & senatus ex illius auctoritate decernentis voluntatem aggregent."—*Eccl. Disc.* 137.

¹ *Full and Plaine*, 178.

² Conyers Read, *op. cit.* I, 18.

lianism, that Puritans like Cartwright were humanists as well as reformers, children of the Renaissance as well as of the Reformation, that their knowledge of Aristotle's works and their belief in his teaching are well attested, that frequently Aristotle is cited in support of Puritan conceptions and institutions, and that the Greek city-state as seen through the eyes of Aristotle is in many respects a model for the constitution of the local Presbyterian commonwealths.

Further, we should carefully note that Aristotle is not the primary source from which the Puritans drew their Presbyterianism, but that their Aristotelianism would give them a predilection in favour of many of its principles, enable them to analyse and systematise the contents of the scheme they found in Scripture, and supply them with weapons wherewith to explain and defend on rational grounds the system they had adopted.

We have not attempted to trace the channels through which Aristotelianism came into Puritanism. Such an attempt would involve an examination of the conciliar and humanist influences bearing upon the Reformation and in particular the urbanism of Calvinism.

This consideration of the Aristotelianism embedded in Presbyterianism reinforces the view that the Puritanism of the sixteenth century is a composite movement—neither simply Scriptural nor simply Calvinist—but like a wise scribe who brings out of his treasure things new and old, a rationally directed eclecticism.

It is obvious that a Puritan Aristotelian was from the point of view of absolute monarchists a politically dangerous person. He applied his Aristotelian views

chiefly to the Church, but it was not natural or possible for him to regard them as inapplicable to the State. Accordingly Whitgift was justified in his vigilant scrutiny of the political implications of Puritanism, and we are not surprised that the revival of Aristotelianism, that synchronised with the recrudescence of Cartwrightism and the temporary triumph of Puritanism in the seventeenth century, roused the violent opposition of the great protagonist of the unitary State and absolute monarchy, Hobbes.¹

The mediaeval Church used the Aristotelian philosophy to undermine the imperial claims that collided with those of the Papacy; for instance, Aquinas in his *Summa* and *De Regimine Principum*, while breaking away from Aristotelianism in his advocacy of the distinction between ecclesiastical and civil society and of the superiority of the Church to the secular government, favours Aristotle's theory of constitutional monarchy or of a mixed state as applied to the latter. If, as Barker suggests, the Reformation brought hostility to Aristotelianism because it was associated with the mediaeval Church's politics and was detrimental to absolute monarchy, such as was establishing itself in the new nation-states, that antipathy is not to be expected in the Puritan Presbyterian section of the reformers, who, while differing from Papal absolutists in applying the Aristotelian theory to Church polity, shared with the Romanists a strong non-Aristotelian belief in the divine rights of the true Church and as strong an Aristotelian objection to the idea of the absolute sovereignty of the civil magistrate.

¹ Barker, *op. cit.* 518, 523. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, c. xlvii.

Appendix

THE SCOTTISH CHURCH AND ARISTOTLE

WE should observe the nature of the strong opposition to Aristotelian thought evinced by Andrew Melville and the express condemnation of Aristotle's tenets by the Scottish General Assembly in April, 1583.¹

The reason why Melville impugned the current axiom, *Absurdum est dicere errasse Aristotelem*,² is made most apparent by the account we have of his conflict, in 1581, with the regents of philosophy in St Leonard's College, St Andrews,

wha heiring, in Mr Androe's ordinar publict lessones of Theologie, thair Aristotle, amangs the rest of the philosophers, the patriarches of heresie, as ane of the ancients termes tham, mightelie confuted, handling the heids anent God, Providence, Creation, etc., maid a strange steir in the Universitie, and cryed "Grait Diana of the Ephesians", thair bread-winner, thair honour, thair estimation, all was gean, giff Aristotle sould be sa owirharled in the heiring of thair schollars; and sa dressit publict orationes against Mr Androe's doctrine.³

According to his nephew, Melville rebutted the charges and ultimately prevailed upon his chief opponents to give up their slavish worship of the pagan philosopher and turn to the study of theology.⁴

¹ *B.U.K.* II, 640-1.

³ *Ibid.* 123.

² J. Melville's *Diary*, 67.

⁴ *Ibid.* 124.

Melville opposed Aristotle's dialectical method, his metaphysics and the un-Christian or anti-Christian ideas that were natural in a pagan philosopher who lived in a pre-Christian age. It was as an academic humanist who believed in the logical method of his master Ramus,¹ and as a Christian theologian, but not as a Puritan Presbyterian that Melville made his attack and it was not against Aristotle's *Politics* that his attack was directed.

The pronouncement of the Scottish General Assembly (April, 1583)² against the teaching of Aristotle evidently arose from such academic disputations as those that troubled St Andrews, and was probably inspired by the zeal and based upon the scholarship of Melville. The Assembly roundly condemns the Aristotelian tenets that are at variance with those of the Christian faith and, actuated by a desire that young men may not be contaminated by non-Christian philosophy and may not lean upon "the bruckle authoritie of profane wryters" "to the great slander of the Word of God and offence of the simple and unlearnit", directs the teachers in schools to confute the errors of non-Christian writers and "in teaching of philosophie, to note the propositiones following, as erronious, false, and aganis the Religioun, and condemnit be the commoun vote of the haill Kirk". The twenty propositions that are specified are found wanting when judged by the standards of Christian theology; they do not give theology its place as the Queen of sciences; they betray pagan ignorance of the perfect unchanging God and His fatherly

¹ McCrie, *Melville*, 386.

² *B.U.K.* II, 640-1.

Providence; they are opposed to the doctrine of original sin; they encourage a belief in the efficacy of human virtue rather than faith; they do not rise to the Christian view of the future life, etc. In short, they are condemned as being incompatible with the received tenets of Christian theology.

This Act of Assembly does not constitute a wholesale denunciation of Aristotle; it is rather a warning against the paedagogic misuse of pagan philosophers. It pronounces liable to ecclesiastical censure those who inculcate such tenets in a philosophical curriculum. It is not a symbol of an anti-Aristotelian reaction based on an antipathy to Roman Catholicism, although some of the propositions condemned could be used by Romanists to buttress principles to which Protestantism is opposed. It may be regarded as an outburst of zeal that shows a lack of historical perspective or that evinces a commendable interest in safeguarding youth from the snares of sub-Christian philosophy. It is an act of repudiation of certain anti-Christian theological implications that underlay pagan thought, but it is not to be taken as a sign of whole-hearted opposition on the part of Melville and the Scottish Church to all the teaching of Aristotle and it is certainly not a condemnation of his political thought, so far as that is compatible with the Christian revelation.

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